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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

State of Idaho
vs.
Kari Janae Phipps

Supreme Court Case No. 46145

CLERK’S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District,
in and for the County of Kootenai

HONORABLE RICHARD S. CHRISTENSEN

Tyler Naftz

Wes Somerton

Public Defender

Coeur d'Alene Prosecutor

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

Coeur d’Alene, Idaho

Coeur d’Alene, Idaho
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR-2016-22188
State of Idaho
vs.
Kari Janae Phipps

Location: Kootenai County District Court
Judicial Otlicer: Christensen, Richard S.
Filed on: 11/22/2016
Appear by: 12/14/2016
Case Number History:

§
§

§
§
§
C\~t l'\FOk\1 \'I IO'\

Offense
Jurisdiction: Coeur d'Alene City Police
Department
I. Drug Paraphernalia-Use or Possess
With Intent to Use

Citation

Statute Deg

Date

C508l4

137MIS
2734A

11118/2016

Case Type: Criminal

(I)

D:\Tf

(' \SE A',Sl(,:\\IE'.\'I

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CR-2016-22188
Kootenai County District Court
05/05/2017
Christensen, Richard S.

P\H.l'I l\1·0101\"IIO\

lead Attorneys
State

State of Idaho
Coeur d'Alene Prosecutor

Defendant

Phipps, Kari Janae

DAIi

11/22/2016
11/23/2016

11/23/2016
12/14/2016

12/14/2016

Naftz, Tyler Robert
Public Defender
208-446-1700(W)
En:',TS

I,.~

OH:llEH:S OF nn: COl RI

hm:x

ffl Initiating Document - Auto Import
Hearing Scheduled
(Pre-Trial Conjerence1Arraignment 12114/20/6 08:30 AM)

ffl Notice of Hearing
Converted Pre-Trial/Arraignment (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Clerk. Magistrate Court)
Hearing result.for Pre-Trial Co~ference!Arraignment scheduled on 12/1412016 08:30 AM:
Arraignment/ First Appearance

ffl Order Appointing Public Defender

12/14/2016

A Plea is entered for Charge:*
- NG (137-2734A(f) Drug Paraphernalia-Use or Possess With Intent to Use)

12/14/2016

Plea
I. Drug Paraphernalia-Use or Possess With Intent to Use
Not Guilty
TCN: :

PAGE I OF6
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COLRT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR-2016-22188
12/14/2016

ffl Court Minutes
Pretrial Conference Arraignment

12/15/2016

Change Assigned Judge: Administrative

12/15/2016

Hearing Scheduled
(Pre-Trial Conference 01/20120/7 01:30 PM)

12/15/2016

Hearing Scheduled
(Jury Trial Scheduled 02/0612017 08:30 AM) 216-2110

12/15/2016

ffl Notice of Hearing

12/16/2016

ffl Notice-Appear of Attorney/Plea-Not Guilty/Request Jury Trial

12/16/2016

ffl Request for Discovery
Defendant's

12/20/2016

ffl Request for Discovery & Alibi Demand

12/20/2016

ffl Response
to Discovery

12/22/2016

ffl Response
to Discovery

01/12/2017

ffl Motion to Suppress

01/17/2017

ffl Notice of Hearing

01/20/2017

Continued
Party: Defendant Phipps, Kari Janae
fl earing result for

01/20/2017

01/20/2017

Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on ()J 1 20/2017 OJ :30 PM: Continued

Pre-trial Conference ( I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson. Clark A.)
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 0//20 12017 01:30 PM: Continued

ffl Court Minutes
Pretrial Conference

01/23/2017

02/03/2017
02/06/2017

02/07/2017

Continued
Party: Defendant Phipps, Kari Janae
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled on 02/06 12017 08:30 AM: Continued 2162/10

ffl Notice of Hearing
Jury Trial (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Clark A.)
2/6-2/10 Hearing result/or Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled on 02106/2017 08:30 AM:
Continued

ffl Objection
to Motion to Suppress

PAGE 2 OF 6
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Koon:-.A1 Cm:1'TY DISTRICT Cm:RT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR-2016-22188
02/13/2017

02/13/2017

Motion to Suppress (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson. Clark A)
Mr. Naji: - 30 min Hearing result for ,\lotion to Suppress/limine scheduled on 0Jil 3,2() 17
09:0() AM: Hearing field

';LI Subpoena Returned
Served-TJ

02/13/2017

G1 Subpoena Returned
Served-CJK

02/13/2017

ffl Court Minutes
Motion to Suppress

02/17/2017

ffl Miscellaneous
List of Authorities to Supplement Suppression Matter

02/17/2017

ffl Miscellaneous
Points and Authorities

03/10/2017

Pre-trial Conference ( I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson. Clark A.)
I/earing result for Pre-Trial Confl!rence scheduled on 03/10/2017 01:30 PM: Hearing Held

03/10/2017

'ffl Court Minutes
Pretrial Conference

03/21/2017

ffl Subpoena Returned
Served-TJ

03/21/2017

ffl Subpoena Returned
Served-CJK

03/27/2017

Jury Trial (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Clark A.)
3127-3131 Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled on 0312712017 08:30 AM:
Disposition With Hearing

03/27/2017

ffl Plea Agreement
Rule l/(a)(2) Conditional

03/27/2017

ffl Acknowledgment of Rights
and Plea

OJ Guilty

03/27/2017

Probation Ordered
Term: 2 years. (lJnsupervised)

03/27/2017

Status Changed
Closed Pending Clerk Action

03/27/2017
03/27/2017

~Judgment

Disposition
I. Drug Paraphernalia-Use or Possess With Intent to Use
Guilty
TCN: :

PAGF 3 OF 6
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KOOTENAI COL:\TY DISTRICT COtTRT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR-2016-22188
03/27/2017

03/27/2017

Sentence (Judicial Officer: Peterson, Clark A.)
I. Drug Paraphernalia-Use or Possess With Intent to Use
Misdemeanor Sentence
Confinement
Type: County Jail
Facility: Kootenai County Public Safety Bldg.
T crm: 90 Days
Suspended: 90 Days
Effective Date: 03/27/2017
Converted Disposition:
Program: Other - See T enns for Details
Complete By: I 0/08/2018
Hours Assigned: 0
Hours Completed: 0
Terms: Enroll in and Complete UGM program
Condition - Adult:
I. Unsupervised Probation, ( 1) Violate no Federal. State or Local Laws More Serious
Than an Infraction (2) Commit no Similar Offenses (3) Do Not Operate a Motor
Vehicle With Any Alcohol in Your Blood Stream (4) Other State will not file any
further charges from this incident, 2Y OM OD, 03/27/2017 • 03/27/2019, Active
03/27/2017

11 Court Minutes
Jury Trial Status Conference

05/05/2017
05/05/2017
05/05/2017

ffl Appeal Filed in District Court
Change Assigned Judge: Administrative

ffl Motion
For Preparation Of Transcripts At County Expense

05/22/2017

~ Transcript Lodged

05/24/2017

ffl Receipt
o/Transcript- PD

05/26/2017

~Receipt
OJTranscript - C'DAPA

06/13/2017

'ffl Notice of Settlement of Transcript
On Appeal and Briefing Schedule

07/24/2017

'II Brief on Appeal

08/31/2017

ffl Stipulation
Motion To Amend Briefing Schedule

09/06/2017

ffl Brief on Appeal
Respondent's

09/11/2017

ffl Order
for Continuance (briefing)

09/11/2017

ffl Notice of Hearing
PAGE 4 OF 6
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KooTE~AI COLNTY DISTRKT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR-2016-22188
09/27/2017

'fl Motion to Continue

10/04/2017

Hearing Vacated
Hearing Result for Appeal !fearing Scheduled on 10/1fi20/703: 00 PM

10/04/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Status Conference 03115120/8 ()3:00 P,H

10/04/2017

ffl Notice of Hearing
Status Conference- March 15,2018 3PM

10/04/2017

fflNotice
Vacating Appeal Hearing

10/05/2017

~ Order to Continue
Christensen

10/11/2017

03/14/2018

CANCELED Appeal (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)
Vacated
Hearing result for Appeal Hearing scheduled on /Oil 1/2017 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

ffl Stipulation
to Vacate Status and Reset for Oral Argument

03/14/2018

'ffl Order
Continuing Status and Resetting/or Oral Argument

03/14/2018

Continued
Hearing Result for Status Conference Scheduled on 031I5/2018 03:00 PM

03/14/2018

Hearing Scheduled
Oral Argument on Appeal 05 1012018 03:00 PM

03/15/2018

Status Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 03/J 5/2018 03:00 PM: Continued

04/30/2018

Scanned

05/10/2018

Oral Argument (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen. Richard S.)

05/10/2018

ffl Exhibit List/Log

06/07/2018

ffl Memorandum
Decision And Order On Appeal

07/06/2018

ffl Notice of Appeal

07/25/2018

'ffl Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Clerk's Record Due

10/03/2018

ffl Order
Granting Extension oftimefOr Clerk's Record

D:\TE

Fl\ \\t 1,\1 l'\FOlnl-\ 110'\
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KOOTENAI COl!NTY DISTRICT Co1:RT

CASE SUMM ARY
CASE No. CR-2016-22188
Defendant Phipps, Kari Janae
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 10/24/2018

200.00
0.00
200.00

PAGE60F6
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CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE- --ATION

•

I

In the court designated below the undersigned certifitWat he/she has just
and reasonable grounds to believe and does believe that on:
County: KOOTENAI

State: ID

Citation#:

C50814

DR#: 16C37552
VIOLATOR
Last Name: PHIPPS
First Name: KARI
Hm. Address: 1718 N 9TH STREET
City: COEUR D ALENE
Height: 502 Weight: 160 Sex: F

Ml: JANAE
Hm. Phone: 509-269-8530
State: ID
Zip: 83815
Race:
Eyes: BLU Hair: BRO
State: ID
Lie. Expires: 2018
Operator: N

Bus.Name:
Bus.Addr.:
Bus.Phone:
Juvenile: N

Class: D

CDL: N

REGISTRATION
Yr. Veh:

Veh. Lie#:

State:

Make:
Color:
VIN:

Model:
Style:

LOCATION
Upon a Public Street or Highway or Other Location Namely:
1201 LINCOLN WAY #38

Hwy:

Mp:

VIOLATIONS
Did unlawfully commit the following Offense(s) on: 11/18/2016, 19:51
Infraction Citation: N
Misdemeanor Citation: Y
Care: N
GVWR 26001+: N
16+ Persons: N
Hazmat: N
Accident: N
Companion Citation: N
Posted Speed:
Observed Speed:
To Wit:

Drug Paraphernalia-use Or Possess W/intent To Use

37-2734A(1)
To Wit:

Witnessing Officer:
Serial# Addr.:
Dept.:
SIGNATURE
hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on
Officer:

-

-:,

11/18/2016, 19:51

....,.---:.:: ✓ _,.,,.,,/.~

••~:-w;e"~ /'", : . - ~ ~ ~

----------------------

Officer name: C.HUTCHISON
Officer ID: K61
COURT INFORMATION

KOOTENAI
324 W GARDEN AVE.
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814-1972
208-446-1170

Contact the Court no later than 12/07/2016. This IS NOT the time
for you to appear before a judge. It is however the time by which YOU MUST
contact the Clerk of the District Court regarding your citation.

Page 8
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..,MUST BE COMPLETED
TO BE CONSIDERED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

·o(\

APPLICATION FOR:.

,J. rh,

DO:EFE r2sT

11

BD"VE ILE

I

□ CHILD □ PARENT

l

CASE NO.

)
BY _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )
PARENT or GUARDIAN OF MINOR

ce..1 u -

Is-<

?Z

FINANCIAL STATEMENT AND ORDER

)

DOB _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )

NOTE: If this application is being made on behalf of a minor, please answer the following questions as they
apply to his/her parents or legal guardian. Include information for you and your spouse.
I, the above named defendant (or the parent(s) on behalf of ,·minor), being .first duly sworn on oath, depose and
say in support of my request for court a~ointed co~ . sel: ·✓
::.L : <
.
,~ . . . r; - ,

cX l_p

My current mailing address is:

3

,"

(/51

ft~ ~

·<. /

City

State

Zip Code

1

My current telephone number or message phone is: __,_(~t_[;_'o.:.._·-L..)_-......{_
___,'--/f_-.. .S."-'.""-3__ft(+-·_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

vO(()S')hgruL\"

Crimes Charged:
\Ct
I request the Court appoi'nt cou~el at county expense; and I agree to reimburse the county for the cost of said
defense, in the sum and upon the terms as the Court may order.
BELOW IS A TRUE AND CORRECT STATEMENT OF MY FINANCIAL CONDITION:
1. EMPLOYMENT:
B. Spouse Employed: _ _yes _ _ no
A. Employed: _ _yes L n o
C. If not employed, or self-employed, last date of employment.__,U"-=-·'...../ 4
D. My employer is: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

f_____________

Address:--------------------------------2.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME MONTHLY (Include income of spouse):
Wages before deductions $
Less Deductions
Net Monthly Wages

3.

$
$

V

Other income: (Specify: Child Support, S.S., V.S., A.D.C.,

·(3'

Food Stamps, Etq.)

p

ff;,rxa S1aa1y,:;

HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES MONTHLY:
Rent or Mortgage Payment $

Child Care

Utilities
Clothing

Recreation
Medical

Transportation
School
Food

$
$
$
$
$

·¥~
[7

Insurance

5,K, ""

Other (Specify)

$
$
$
$
$

/tjr--

eso

$---'--=-,:>_,- - - -

rJ

~

fj

"Cl

IIJ

C>

C

i

.!:!

:E
::,
00
00

~

--

II.

en
C

§

--

0
~
I
..,
C>.
-. ~
._
a
~c ~ ~ - - - -

rb~"Ei==
c.>OOCQ

Financial Statement and Order Regarding Public Defender, page 1

Page 9

DC 028 Rev. 5/14

3.

•

•

HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES MONTHLY: (cont.)

DEBTS: Creditor

----------Creditor
------,-~,..- - - - - ....,, ....

Creditor - - - - - - - -,,> - . ~ - - - 4.

Total$ - - ~ - - -

$ - - - - - ~ ermo

Total$ - - + - - - - TotaI$ -. - - - - " - - - - -

$

ermo

$

ermo

ASSETS:
A. I (we) have cash on hand or in banks

$

B. I (we) own personal property valued at
C. I (we) own vehicle(s) valued at

$
$

D. I (we) own real property valued at

$

E. I (we) own stocks, bonds, securities, or interest therein $

~

~

5.

THE FOLLOWING ALSO AFFECTS MY FINANCIAL CONDITION (Specify): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

6.

DEPENDENTS:

__l_self

___spouse

___ children
(num~

___other (specify) _ _ _ __
_

AP~\;wl>
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

\0 (:

lj i-"' day of

1

( ·-

,

201(__.

NOTARYP~i@
The above named
\/"defendant _ _ _ _ parent _ _ _ _ guardian appeared before the
court on the aforesaid charge and requested t h ~ of counsel. The court having considered the foregoing, and
having personally examined the applicant; ___ORDERS _ _ _ DENIES the appointment of the service of
counsel.

THE APPLICANT MAY BE ORDERED TO PAY REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE COST OF APPOINTED COUNSEL
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE.
ENTERED this

Custody Status: __ In

l:fl--

day of

Vaut

12 ~,( ·
JUDGE
Copies to:
h}'Prosecuting Attorney _

__L(\_Jl-

Wublic Defender
Bond$- - - - - -

\
Date

,t(J{J
~
epu1y Cle,1}

Financial Statement and Order Regarding Public Defender, page 2
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Log of lK-COURTROOMl 1.14/2016

Page 1 of 1

Description CR 2016-22188 Phipps, Kari 20161214 Pretrial Conference Arraignment
Judge Stow
Clerk Taylor Luckey
Def Rights Video 08:32AM

((!J#1r Jt Pu

Date 12/14/2016

09:45:52AM
09:46:00AM

Note

Speaker

Time

1/
\J

111 K-COUR-~OOM11

Location

Judge Stow

Calls Case
Defendant Present. PA Present, Eileen Paul.

Def

Understands rights video. Understands charges and
potential penalties.

09:46:12 AM

Requests public defender

09:46:13 AM J

Oath

09:46:20AM

Reviews pd application

09:46:48AM

Appoint Public Defender
NG/PTC/JT

09:47:14 AM_, End
Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com

CR-2016-22188

CMIN
Court Minutes
634052

Ill IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Ill

.L'!l - . // ,n.

n.

I_-=_ ... ___ ... _ Ir< •• : ••• =--_ 1

,c,,. ____ /r<n 0/ ~IV\1\1 r.

~~

1 000/ ~l\nl.! •••• -

Page 11
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Log of 1K-CRT4 on 1/20/2017

•

•

Page 1 of 1

Description CR 2016-22188 Phipps, Kari 20170120 Pretrial Conference
Judge Walsh
Clerk Wanda Butler
(1~
Date 1/20/2017
Tim-

Llli,Ak Yi~ ,

Location

Speaker

ll1K-CRT4

Note

02:03:45 PM J

Kari Phipps

02:03:48 PM

CR 16-22188

02:03:50 PM

Ms. Phipps present with Mr. Naftz and Mr. Gowey for
state.

02:04:05 PM Mr. Naftz

Request to continue for motion to suppress on 2/13.

02:04:16 PM Mr. Gowey

No objection with waiver of speedy.

02:04:25 PM Mr. Naftz

She'll waive speedy trial.

02:04:31 PM DF

Understand request to continue.

02:05:03 PM

Understand waiver of speedy trial and I will waive speedy
trial.

02:05:17 PM J

Accept waiver of speedy trial.

02:05:23 PM

I will find good cause to continue for Motion to Suppress.

02:05:38 PM

Matter will be regularly reset.

02:05:55 PM end
Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com

CR-2016-22188

CMIN
court Minutes

illl\l\lll\\ll\l\1111

file:///R:/Magistrate/Criminal/Walsh/CR%202016-22188%20Phipps,%20Kari%20201701...
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•
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Log of 1K-CRT8 on 2/13/201.

Page 1 of 8

Description CR 2016-22188 Phipps, Kari 20170213 Motion to Suppress
Judge Peterson
~
Clerk Cassie Poole
~~.,,(_,,,( ··~
Date 2/13/2017

.Time

Ii 1K-CRT8

I Location

u

Note

Speaker

10:50:56AM Judge
Peterson

Defendant present not in custody with Mr. Naftz, Ms. Paul for
the city

10:51:26 AM

Going to hearing, stipulate there was a detention when
probation entered residence to conduct search

Naftz, Tyler

I 10:51 :39 AM I Paul,

Eileen I That is correct

10:52:09 AM

Having evidentiary hearing, agree warrantless arTest.

10:52:30 AM

Challenging that it was an unlawful seizure of Ms. Phipps
Naftz, Tyler anything after that asking be excluded. The discovery of
paraphernalia and any statements she may have made.

10:53:15 AM

It is fair to say upon entry of probation officers that the detention
does occur at that point. Officers would testify that it is their
Paul, Eileen
policy that once they make entry into residence parties aren't
free to go. It is ain investigative detention at that point.

10:53:57 AM

Naftz, Tyler

I think that is fine stipulate to that. The entry is when detention
occurred challenging it wasn't investigatory.

I 10:54:25 AM !Paul, Eileen ICalls witness
10:54:27 AM Clerk
ISwears witness
~~:5,1:45 AM Naftz, Tyler Move to exclude witnesses
10:54:49 AM Judge
Peterson
10:54:57 AM

r'°'

Exclude witnesses

CR-2016-22188
CMIN
Court Minutes
633980

Ill I 111111111111111111111111111111111111

DX

10:54:58 AM
Officer
Kuebler

I am employed with Idaho department of corrections as felony
probation officer. Been employed just under 2 years. I was
employed in that capacity on 11/18/16. I did respond to 1201
Lincoln way #38

10:55:21 AM

I responded to location to do residence check on felony
probationer that lives in that apartment. Terry Williams. I was
with another officer. Officer Johnson. Mr. Williams was assigned
to Officer Johnson. Often conduct home visits in teams for
officer safety. Mr. Williams had agreement that we could search
residence while on parole. He was on parole. It is common
practice for department to have an agreement related to
residence searches.

10:56:25 AM

At time of entry was aware agreement existed with Mr. Williams.
Upon making entry into residence Terry Wilson not Williams was

file:///R:/Magistrate/Criminal/Peterson/CR%202016-22188%20Phipps,%20Kari%2020170 ... 2/13/2017
Page 13

•

Log of 1K-CRT8 on 2/13/20.

Page 2 of 8

there and female exited a back bedroom it was just those 2
there. Did knock. Terry answered the door. I did seek entry at
that time. He consented to entry.
10:57:19 AM

Once in the residence made contact with Ms. Phipps. Ms.
Phipps exited the back bedroom we asked her to take a seat in
the living-room, cleared bedrooms for other persons, found 2
safes in the back bedroom that were later found to have
controlled substances in them we called for local law
enforcement to handle the drugs found in the safes. While law
enforcement was on the way I asked the residence if there was
anything else in the apartment and notified would have drug dog
on scene if needed Ms. Phipps stated she had meth pipe in her
·backpack.

10:58:29 AM

First noticed Ms. Phipps while walking into the apartment. So
have policy related to other individuals in residence when do
residence check. It is not a policy more officer safety when enter
residence require everyone to stay in the living room until clear
the residence. When entering residence with someone on felony
probation people who hang out there a lot of time find felony
warrants or other drugs. Don't want individuals leaving and
coming back knowing we are in the residence with intentions of
harming officer.

10:59:37 AM

Did have contact with Ms. Phipps on the date in questions
briefly. At the time had interaction with Ms. Phipps Officer
Johnson and Terry were present not sure if Mr. Wood had
arrived on scene yet. Mr. Wood was another individual how
showed up about 5-10 minutes after arrived.

11:01:06 AM

Demeanor during interaction was just like it is now. Ms. Phipps
was somewhere in the living room during conversation either on
the couch or in a chair. I didn't say anything else other than drug
dog was coming that lead to Ms. Phipps admitting to pipe in
backpack. I didn't take any action police department was
already on the way to handle felony drugs when they arrived I
informed them she made statement of having meth pipe in
backpack.

11:02:15 AM Naftz, Tyler

ex

11:02:21 AM

I didn't have any indication that Mr. Wilson was violating terms
of parole. Didn't suspect he had drugs in the home. Didn't
suspect he had firearm. I arrived with Officer Johnson for safety
reasons he is my partner. When had contact with Ms. Phipps
she was carrying her backpack. She didn't have bulges in
clothes that I recall. I didn't search backpack or ask to search
backpack. Officer Johnson didn't ask to search backpack. I am
familiar with residence I have been there before usually once or
twice a month. Have an understanding of the layout. It is an
apartment 2 bedroom. 1 entrance there is back patio but no
stairs. It is the 3rd level. Front door is the only way out.

,

Officer
Kuebler

file:///R:/Magistrate/Criminal/Peterson/CR%202016-22 l 88%20Phipps, %20Kari%2020170 ... 2/13/2017
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Log of 1K-CRT8 on 2/13/20.

Page 3 of 8

11:04:16 AM

When ordered Ms. Phipps and Mr. Wilson to gather in the living
room we had just walked in. When enter clear the doorway he
stayed in the living room with Ms. Phipps as I cleared the
bedrooms.

11:05:09 AM

There isn't requirement to hold persons not on probation during
search it is officer safety practice. That is what trained to do.

11:05:50 AM

I asked one question. I don't recall asking for her information my
partner might have. At one time I am sure she was ran we
usually run individuals we don't know. We have meet her before
on prior home visit. We go to that house a lot.

11:06:27 AM

Prior to asking if there was anything else should know about I
didn't clear Ms. Phipps thru dispatch but can't speak as to my
partner. I didn't know if she had a warrant.

11:07:14AM

I took cda police 15-20 minutes to get there I can't recall for sure
it was a few months ago. Conducted search of back bedroom.
Officer Johnson was in the living room with Terry and Ms.
Phipps. Didn't find weapons in the back bedroom. No guns. I
don't recall if found knife.

11:07:58 AM

At some point Terry was probably patted down. Didn't find
anything on him. Ms. Phipps was never patted down.

11:08:32 AM Paul, Eileen Re DX
11:08:35 AM

Officer
Kuebler

In that apartment complex there is a lot of drug activity several
offenders live there when we go to one we go to them all. I did
become familiar with Ms. Phipps due to being at Terry's a lot

11:09:04 AM Naftz, Tyler Objection relevance.
11:09:04 AM Judge
Peterson
11:09:12 AM
Officer
Kuebler

11:10:27 AM
-

Sustain
It was a small apartment were pretty much already in living room
asked them to sit down. Question about anything else in the
apartment was a general statement we do have a drug dog on
call we often call in for searches. Question was a general
statement.
Residence check is for compliance with parole. It is our duty to
make sure they are obeying the laws they should. One way
could be in violation is possession of drugs or paraphernalia.

11:10:58 AM Naftz, Tyler ReCX
11 :11 :01 AM

Officer
Kuebler

At the time on 11/18 when conducted search suspected drugs
after found safes. Prior to go in there no suspicion of drug
activity.

11:11:33 AM Paul, Eileen Re DX
11:11:34AM Officer
Kuebler

I

Conversation about drug dog was after discovered safes.

I

file:///R:/Magistrate/Criminal/Peterson/CR%202016-22 l 88%20Phipps, %20Kari%2020170 ... 2/13/20 I 7
Page 15

•
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I

11:12:30 AM Paul, Eileen Calls witness

Page 4 of 8

11:12:33 AM Clerk

Swears witness

11:12:58AM Paul, Eileen

DX

11:13:00 AM

Travis Johnson. I am employed as parole agent with Idaho
department of corrections. Been employed 3 years. I was
employed on 11/18/16 in that capacity. I did respond with officer
Kuebler to 1201 Lincoln Way #38 to check on parole who
reported that address as residence. That is Terry Williams. I am
familiar with agreement related to residence check. His
reside.nee is subject to verification and search at anytime.

Officer
Johnson

11:14:00 AM

That agreement relates to other individuals in the house. When
we respond to an address anyone in that house we have sit in
common area while conduct verification and search. That is
department procedure to insure officer safety. We do that every
time enter a home. When report to address don't always know
who is there like to identify everyone in the residence and make
sure there isn't anyone else in rooms and no one else is present
easier to have everyone in common area while other officer
does search. That is what did. Search was with consent of Terry
Wilson. Did make contact with Ms. Phipps. Once in residence
Ms. Phipps came out of bedroom with backpack on. We had her
take a seat in the living room. She didn't make any statements. I
continued to talk with Terry Wilson the parole on case load.
Officer Kuebler had contact with Ms. Phipps. I was present for
contact.

11:16:07 AM

What Officer Kuebler stated was we were going to conduct
residence search and were bringing in K-9 and if anyone ha
issues with that. It happened prior to search. Search revealed
meth pipe.

11:16:41 AM Naftz, Tyler Objection foundation that paraphernalia was meth pipe
11:16:53AM Judge
Peterson
11:16:56AM
Officer
Johnson

Overrule
Ms. Phipps stated she had meth pipe in backpack in her
possession. I believe there were a couple safes in a bedroom
that she came out of. Officer Kuebler located those. He
discovered those after advised law enforcement and k-9 was on
the way.

11:17:53 AM

When entered residence and observed Ms. Phipps come out of
room with backpack had take a seat we stated we wou Id ·
conduct residence search and would bring K-9 over Officer
Kuebler asked if she had anything in her backpack that K-9
would detect she was honest and admitted meth pipe.

11:18:55 AM

Safe was found after advised k-9 would assist with search but
before officers.
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Common procedure to bring K-9 when we have one available.
That is consented to in parole's agreement. I was present at the
time Officer Kuebler made statement regarding k-9 arriving at
residence. Statement was generally to both parties they were
both in the living room. I was familiar with Ms. Phipps I meet Ms.
Phipps on prior home verifications at that residence.

11:19:24 AM

11:20:38 AM

Page 5 of 8

Naftz, Tyler

ex

Officer
Johnson

Entered residence and saw Ms. Phipps coming from back
bedroom. Didn't see bulges in clothing. Didn't do pat down
search of Ms. Phipps. Didn't do pat down of Mr. Wilson at that
point. Didn't run Ms. Phipps ID at that time. I don't know we ran
her name at that point. At some point did run her name. It
happened during the contact that night. Don't know if ran her
name prior to search.

11:20:41 AM

11:22:42 AM

I specifically didn't run her name that night not sure what return
came back. I didn't see Officer Kuebler run her name. CDA city
police responded to assist us possible they ran her name. She
was not clear to leave atthat time because of procedure.

11:23:32 AM

Officer Kuebler did search of residence I remained in living
room. Ms. Phipps was not on felony probation at that time. I
believe we were talking don't recall exact conversation. Didn't
have reason to believe Ms. Phipps was violating the law. Didn't
suspect she was going to commit a crime.

11:25:07 AM Paul, Eileen Re DX
11:25:10AM
Officer
Johnson

I was talking with both because we were all in the living room.
Don't recall specifics of conversation. The conversation was
relaxed. Don't remember the specifics of conversation was
generally about purpose for being at the apartment.
Both parties were cooperative and compliant with what asked to
do which was sit in the living room while finished check of
apartment. There was another individual who arrived at the
apartment after we got there. At time of question regarding k-9
no other law enforcement was present.

11:26:41 AM

11:27:49 AM Naftz, Tyler ReCX
11:27:51 AM

Officer
Johnson

11:29:08 AM

l(]g9:19AM i Paul, Eilee
11:29:22 AM Officer
Johnson

I didn't write report regarding incident. Not required to write
incident report. No recording devises. I was wearing something
similar to what wearing now. Describes what wearing.
Before cda police arrived not aware if anyone ran Ms. Phipps
name.

DX
We were going to request k-9 there was one available that
night.

11:30:02 AM Naftz, Tyler ReCX
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11:30:06AM Officer
Johnson

Page 6 of 8

I don't recall Ms. Phipps asking to leave. Don't recall her asking
any questions.

11:30:31 AM Paul, Eileen Calls witness
11:30:34 AM Clerk

Swears witness

11:31:07 AM Paul, Eileen DX
11:31:16AM
Officer
Hutchinson

Caleb Hutchinson. I am employed as cda police department
patrol coming up on 2 years. I do have training and experience
in investigation in drugs. I have approximately 8 years
experience in law enforcement. I did respond to 1201 Lincoln
way #38 at request of probation and parole.

11:32:04 AM Naftz, Tyler Objectic:>n
11:32:06 AM Judge
Peterson
11:32:11 AM

Officer
Hutchinson

Overrule
Upon arriving at apartment in contacted probation officer they
advised me they had a male and female they had spoken with
and detained female stated had meth pipe in bag

11:32:38 AM Naftz, Tyler Object hearsay
11:32:47 AM Officer
Hutchinson

That is what was reported to me from probation

11:33:00 AM Paul, Eileen Goes to state of mind of Officer Hutchinson
11:33:08 AM Judge
Peterson

I

Receive not for the truth.

11:33:18 AM

At time of contact with probation officer I was at the apartment I
began to interview the male and female separately. I spoke to
the male first Mr. Woods. I do recognize Ms. Phipps she is
sitting at defense table. I did identify her on scene probation
Officer
Hutchinson officers gave me her ID. They advised they ran her thru dispatch
and handed me their id's. Spoke with Mr. Woods and Ms.
Phipps. Mr. Woods was in the front room and Phipps was in the
bedroom.

11:34:46 AM

I spoke with Ms. Phipps in the bedroom asked her reason for
being there I spoke to her about a safe and the contents of
backpack. I did read Ms. Phipps her miranda rights when first
started talking to her. I don't recall conversation prior to miranda
rights.

11:35:30 AM

Probation officers located 2 safes under futon style bed in the
bedroom I asked her if she had ownership or knew about
contents of the safe, she denied knowledge of the contents of
the safe I asked her about meth pipe in backpack she told me
she did have meth pipe in backpack. I searched back pack and
located meth pipe.

11:36:12 AM Naftz, Tyler

ex

I
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11:36:21 AM

Page 7 of 8

When arrived at residence Office·r Kuebler and Johnson's ·were
present. I don't know which one handed me the ID believe it was
Kuebler. I believe it was drivers license ID. My understanding
was Officer Kuebler ran the names. Neither one of them had
warrants. My understanding was Ms. Phipps was not on felony
probation at the time. Initially contacted ms. Phipps in a
bedroom. I had conversation with the male first.

Officer
Hutchinson

11:38:22 AM

I informed that I knew there was something in her backpack. I
don't believe I asked for her consent to search backpack.

11:38:55 AM

I did give Ms. Phipps her ID back and tell her she could leave
after finished my investigation and gave her citation. That was
after I searched her backpack. I did ask her if she had drug
paraphernalia in her back pack.

11:40:20 AM

I asked her questions and she told me she had meth pipe. I
would have to review video I don't believe asked for consent to
search. I may have asked her but didn't rely on her consent to
search.

11:40:59 AM Paul, Eileen Re DX
11:41:01 AM Officer
Hutchinson
11:41:48 AM

I advised of meth pipe after read her miranda rights.

Naftz, Tyler No testimony at this time.

11:42:09 AM

This is interesting why don't you tell me where you disagree,
appears no probable cause or suspicion of criminal activity
when officers entered the residence, when entered they saw
Ms. Phipps exit bedroom had no indication that offense had
occurred.

.

Judge
Peterson

11:42:56 AM

Pursuant to officer safety policy were going to do sweep of
apartment the sweep my guess would be phase 1 and at some
point statement was made related to drug dog. Ms. Phipps
allegedly indicated she had meth pipe however one would
imagine that as after sweep to see if anyone else was present,
that question seems would occur prior to search, residence was
searched and safes were found at some point during interaction
identification was gained one would imagine that would happen
early on and then by time officer arrived the statement regarding
meth pipe had been made and he got ID's from parole officers
and parole officers had already cleared.

11:44:39 AM Paul, Eileen I don't know court mentioned miranda rights
11:44:46AM Judge
Peterson

No one mirandized until Officer Hutchinson did so later. When
he arrived he received probable cause for him.

11:45:36 AM

Think this is interesting question would permit until Friday to
submit materials. Don't know policy is sufficient to hold a citizen
if they can be cleared and released would like to know if there is

case law.

I

II

I
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I

Page 8 of 8

11:46:57 AM Naftz, Tyler ~At one point id's were taken likely early on.
Enter hold, do sweep and then ID would be likely events.
Probation has capacity to review and clear citizens for warrants.

11:48:25 AM
11:49:27 AM

I

Judge
Peterson

Can send in list of cases to review. Will be deemed under
advisement and de~med submitted Friday at 5 pm will set for
oral pronouncement or issue written decision.

11:50:06AM End
Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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Log of 1K-CRT7 on 3/10/201.

Description CR 2016-22188 Phipps, Kari 20170310 Pretrial Conference
Judge Peterson
Clerk Tiffany Burton
\

Page 1 of 1

?

?

ll/})/~ L~
' V)

Date 13110,2011

I

~

Location

Speaker

Time

02:23:23 PM Judge
Peterson

02:23:40 PM

J

111 l~lCRTij

/

Note
Calls case; Def present not in custody DA Mr. Lambert; PA Ms.
Paul
Also here for the courts decision. Commend everyone, was an
outstanding hearing. Def was present during a probation status
search, no belief of criminal wrong-dong. She was detained for
officer safety reasons. She made a comment that she had a
meth pipe in her backpack. Case authority presented to me,
appears clear the supreme court case law and 9th circuit case
law suggests the same applies to probation searches at homes.
Not different from that of a search warrant. Officers may detain, it
was not unlawful. Court is bound by Supreme Court precedent.
Deny Motion to Suppress.

02:28:13 PM DA

Will remain set. Ready for trial.

02:28:22 PM PA

Ready for trial.

02:28:25 PM J

Will leave matter set.

02:28:33 PM End
Produced by FTR GoldTM
www.fortherecord.com
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Court Minutes
633934
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Tyler R. Naftz, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Public Defender Kootenai County
PO.Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: {208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 9825

STATE. OF ID.t.}JO

COUNTY OF KO

l

ENAI

FILE

n

( :.-,S

'

AT~Jr-~-.rrt~·

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND F-OR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER
CR-16-0022188
)
Misd
)
V.
)
RULE ll(a)(2) CONDITIONAL PLEA
)
AGREEMENT
KARI JANAE PHIPPS,
)
)
)
Defendant.
)
--------------In accordance with Rule 1 l(a)(2) of the Idaho Criminal Rules, the above named Defendant,

STATE OF IDAHO,

by and through her attorney, Tyler R Naftz, Deputy Public Defender, and the State ofldaho, through
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Eileen Paul, agree that the Defendant (1) may enter a conditional plea
of guilty to the charge in this case, (2) reserves the right to appeal the March 10, 2017 Order denying
her Motion to Suppress, and (3) shall be allowed to withdraw her plea of guilty if she prevails on
appeal.
DATED this

27

day of March, 2017.
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY

CR-2016-22188
PLAG
Plea Agreement
633895

Ill IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII I IIll

BY:~~
TY~FTZ
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Page 1

Page 22
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••
DATED this

•

_2~7~- dayofMarch,2017.~----,---

~
DEFENDANT

DATED this

J7

day of March, 2017.

OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI COUTY
PROSECUTING ATTO~

EIL~m~\
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a
copy of the same in the interoffice mailbox on the _ _ _ day of March, 2017, addressed to:
Coeur d'Alene Prosecutor FAX 769-2326 Prosecutor
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Page 1 of2

Description CR 2016-22188 Phipps, Kari 20170327 Jury Trial Status Conference
/\
Judge Van Valin
Clerk Cassie Poole
{ ~('\A /J ~
Date 3/27/2017

Time

Location

Speaker

~---

- 111 K-CRT7

Note

11 :38 :45 AM Judge Van Valin

Defendant present not in custody with Mr. Naftz, Ms.
Paul for the state

11 :38:55 AM Naftz, Tyler

Ask accept conditional plea the state has stipulated to.
Conditional plea to possession of paraphernalia

11:39:37 AM

90 days jail 86 suspended 2 shifts sip
500 fine 300 suspended
1 year unsupervised probation
Substance abuse eval
No additional charges to be filed from this incident.

11 :40:06 AM Paul, Eileen

That is correct

, , :"tu.

1,

MM Judge Van Valin

Review charge/penalties

=

=
=

11 :40:45 AM Phipps, Kari

Understand charge/penalties
Understand you don't have to agree with rec's.
ll=====~l=======~~=======================m
~
iiiiiiiiiiiiiii
11 :41 :04 AM
Understand rights form
~ "' ~
I
'5 ~
No questions
); ~.~
1
;=1=1:=4=1=:1=4=A=M~iF======~FU=n=d=e=ra=ta=n=d=g=i=v=in=g=u=p=r=ig=h=m=if=a=dm=it=c=h=a=~=e===~~jl
Not under the influence
11:41:28 AM

No promises/threats

11:41:34 AM

Plead guilty to possession of paraphernalia - I did have
paraphernalia

:55 AM Judge Van Valin

Accept plea find it knowingly and voluntarily entered

11 :42:05 AM Paul, Eileen
11:42:24 AM
Naftz, Tyler

It was meth paraphernalia
Currently seeking treatment at UGM.
Asking for 90 days to be granted to obtain substance
_abuse eval so she can start treatment tomorrow.

I
11:43:05 AM

The state has agreed to not file additional charges in this
matter.

11 :43:46 AM Phipps, Kari

it was about a process to get into ugm.

11:44:00 AM
11:44:13 AM

IMy daughters are with my parents right now
Due to program they don~ allow you to work It is a 16
_month program.

I

11 :44:27 AM Judge Van Valin

500 fine suspend 500

11 :44:51 AM Paul, Eileen

Let me look and see if there is a lab fee
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11:45:01 AM Judge Van Valin

90 days jail

11:45:14AM Paul, Eileen

$200 lab fee we didn't discuss that.

11:45:25AM
Judge Van Valin

ISP should get paid back
90 days jail 90 suspended
2 year unsupervised probation
Review conditions

Phipps, Kari

Don't know address at UGM I told Tyler I would call him
when I found out address

11:46:27 AM

11:46:42 AM Naftz, Tyler

We will contact the court when find out address

11:46:51 AM

Noting state won't file additional charges out of this
incident

Judge Van Valin

11:47:10AM

I think UGM requires eval.

11:47:44 AM Paul, Eileen

Can require to complete ugm

11:47:49 AM

Think I will order to enroll and complete ugm program
and file proof of completion with in 560 days.

Judge Van Valin

11:48:39 AM

I 11 :48:44 AM I Phipps, Kari
I 11 :49:09 AM I End

Get in the program and give it your all

IAccept terms.

I

I

Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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CR-2016-22188
ACKR
Acknowledgment of Rights

)~t . C7C7' 1c,c,)__c'L/?-,,

CASE No.·

c) "I

STATE OF IDAHO

~~~~ o~!e~ J . { J
AT / /

trf)

O'Clock_~iJ-+--_M

CLERK OFT~DIS)J3JCT COURT

Gd(,~----

Deputy

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RIGHTS UPON GUILTY PLEA
1.

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court.

2.

You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you can not afford the services of an
attorney you are entitled to a court appointed lawyer at public expense.

3.

You have the right to a trial by jury. In order for the jury to reach a verdict all six (6) jurors must
agree on the verdict.

4.

The burden of proving any criminal charge is solely upon the prosecution. The State must prove
each and every element of the criminal charge by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

5.

You have a right to cross examine any witness that the State calls against you and to confront any
evidence presented.

6.

You have the right to bring witnesses of your own choosing to testify on your behalf at trial. You
may compel the attendance of witnesses without expense to you.

7.

You have the right to testify at trial on your own behalf. You can not be forced to testify. If you
choose not to testify or call any witnesses, your silence at trial can not be used against you.

8.

You have the right to appeal the conviction.

9.

If you plead guilty you are admitting that you have committed the crime with which you are
charged.

10. If you plead guilty you are giving up any defense that you may have to the charge.
11. If you plead guilty there will not be a trial and you will be giving up those rights that go along with
the trial that have been explained in this document.
12. The court will explain to you the maximum penalty for the crime charged. The court will also tell
you if there is a mandatory penalty that must be imposed if you plead guilty.
13. If the prosecutor has agreed to make a certain recommendation to the court regarding the
sentence it is important that you understand that the court is not required to go along with that
recommendation.
14. If you are not a citizen of the United States, it is possible that the entry of a guilty plea could have
immigration consequences of deportation, inability to obtain legal status, or denial of United States
citizenship.

I HAVE READ THIS STATEMENT AND FULLY UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENT.
DATED this:2.-:Z

Signature of Defendant

day of

rrJ tl_ ((b

,20

t1

0 ~ ~~(?r?

Acknowledgment of Rights Upon Guilty Plea

DC 039 Rev. 12-09
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FIRST .JUDICIAL JiilRICT COURT, STATEOF IDAHO, COll)iiY OF KOOTENAI
324 W. GARDEN ,.NUE, P.O. BOX 9000, COEUR D'ALENF9AHO 83816-9000
CR-2016-22188

JUDGME
FILED ,

JDMT
STATE Oil IDAHO V
Judgment
KARI JANAE PHIPPS
633885
1718N 9TH ST
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83815
111111111111111 III III III II III III III II Ill
ID
AGENCY: COEUR D'ALENE PD

3-,2--7 ., 7

CASE# CR-2016-0022188 CITATION# C50814
CHARGE: l37-2734A(1) DRUG PARAPHERNALIA-USE OR POSSESS WITH INTEN TO USE
AMENDED:
The defendant having been fully advised of his/her statutory and constitutional rights including the right to be represented by counsel, and
Been advised of right to court appointed counsel if indigent
□ O,efendant waived right to counsel
Judgment-Not Guilty
1!1'D¢endant represented by counsel
Judgment on Trial-Guilty
!Mlidgment, Plea of Guilty/ Rights Waived
Judgment for Defendant/ Infraction
Withheld Judgment □ Accepted
Judgment for State/ Infraction
Dismissed.______________
Bond Forfeited / Conviction Entered - Case Closed
□ Dismissed - States Motion
□ Bond Forfeited / Dismissed
MONIES ORD.,jf(ED PAID:
A $2.00 handling fee will be imposed on each installment.
~ine / Penalty$ , $
which includes costs, and probation fee if applicable.
Suspended$
Pay within 30 days of today, or enroll in time payment program BEFORE due date.
Community Service*_ _ _ _ hours by _ _ _ _ _ _ Setup Fee $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Insurance Fee$ _ _ _ _ _ __
□ C~nity Service* in lieu ofj_ail Must sign up within 7 days*.
~eimburse 1J_,$ (? - 'lt/).O'D
□ Restitution _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
□ Bond Exonerated, provided that any deposit shall first be applied pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2923 in satisfaction of outstanding fines, fees
and costs with any remainder to be refunded to the posting party. D Authorization from defendant to pay restitution and/or infractions from bond.
No Contact Order, as condition of bond, terminated.
INCARCERATlj)N OJlJlERED:
l:B1ail~'fUL-->PC.---days, Suspended
days, Credit_ _ _ _days, Discretionary Jail _ _ _ _days are imposed & will
be scheduled by the Adult Misdemeanor Probation Office, or Court, for violations of the terms below or on the attached addendum.
Report to Jail _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Release_________
Work Release Authorization (if you qualify).
□ Sheriff's Community Labor Program in lieu of Jail (if you qualify)____ hours by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Must sign up within 7 days.
Follow the Labor Program schedule and policies.

_s-rtJ~~----

ftJ

DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED_ _ _ _ _ days commencing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
REINSTATEMENT OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED before you can drive. Apply to DRIVER'S SERVICES, P.O. Box 7129,
Boise, ID 83707-1129.
Temporary Driving Privileges Granted commencing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
To, from and for work purposes / required medical care / court ordered alcohol program / community service. Must carry proof of work
schedule and liability insurance at all times. Not valid if insurance expires.
PROBATION ooo€RED FOR d--,
YEAR(S) ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
~
Supervised - See Addendum
~late no federal, state or local laws more serious than an infraction.
~mmit no similar offenses.
D Myfltain liability insurance on any vehicle that you drive.
!;rO'o not operate a motor vehicle with any alcohol or controlled substances in your bloodstream.
□ You must submit to any blood alcohol concentration test requested of you, with reasonable cause, by a peace officer.
D O!M'fun a - - - - . . . . - - - - - - - ~ - - - - , and file proof of
, within _ _ _ _ days.
!w€nro11 in & complete___,IIV---"'-lf---!.---'-----"'----~1--11-i,f-fl,,-.,q,:,---- program. File proof of completion within-G'~~~days.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kari Janae Phipps (hereinafter, Ms. Phipps) appeals from her judgment of conviction
dated March 27, 2017, entered upon her conditional guilty plea to LC.§ 37-2734A(l), Drug
Paraphernalia- Use or Possess with Intent to Use. Ms. Phipps asserts that the magistrate court
erred by denying her motion to suppress because the warrantless seizure of her person was
unlawful and without legal justification, therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and Article I § 17 of the Constitution of the State ofldaho.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Phipps was present during a search of a parolee's apartment pursuant to the parolee's
consent via a condition of parole subjecting his residence to verification and search at any time.
(Reporter's Transcript on Appeal ("Rep. Tr."), May 22, 2017, at 9:8-14; 27:11-19). In the course
of the search, Ms. Phipps, who is neither a resident of the parolee's apartment nor a probationer
or parolee herself, was ordered to sit in the living room. (Rep. Tr. at 19:1-4). During the search,
Ms. Phipps was detained and questioned regarding whether she had anything in her backpack a
K9 would detect. (Id. at 31 :23-32:7). It is uncontroverted that Ms. Phipps was not free to leave
the premises. (Id. at 37:2-8). Further, the trial court recognized that, in Ms. Phipps's case, there
was no belief of criminal wrongdoing of any kind. (Id. at 63 :8-10). Thus, the record reflects that
Ms. Phipps was detained, and that this detention was not based on reasonable suspicion.
Rather, the justification for the probation and parole officers' detention of Ms. Phipps
was twofold: investigatory - not wanting individuals to leave in the event other drugs or felony
warrants were found - and officer safety, preventing individuals on the premises during a
residence check from departing in case they intended to come back and harm officers. (Id. at
12:18-13:11). Based on Ms. Phipps's statements during that detention, she was further held
1
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pending arrival of Coeur d'Alene Police. (Id. at 20:4-18). After police arrived, Ms. Phipps was
read her Miranda rights and her backpack was searched (Id. 48:6-49:3). Ms. Phipps was cited for
possession of paraphernalia. (Id. 51: 15-18).
Ms. Phipps filed a Motion to Suppress statements made to parole and police officers and
evidence recovered from her backpack, asserting that her warrantless seizure was without legal
justification. A hearing on Ms. Phipps's motion was held on February 13, 2017, wherefore the
Honorable Judge Peterson, Magistrate, took the matter under advisement. Subsequently, on
March 10, 2017, Judge Peterson denied Ms. Phipps's Motion to Suppress. The Magistrate Court
found the state's officer safety argument persuasive, essentially holding that officer authority to
detain persons pursuant to a search warrant likewise applies to probation searches of homes. (Id.
at 63:18-64:5). In so holding, the Magistrate Court relied on United States Supreme Court
precedent and Federal precedent from the Ninth Circuit. (Id. at 63:20-23; 64:6-12).
On March 27, 2017, Ms. Phipps entered a conditional guilty plea to I.C. § 37-2734A(l),
Drug Paraphernalia- Use or Possess with Intent to Use, reserving the right to appeal Judge
Peterson's denial of her Motion to Suppress. Her Judgment of conviction was entered the same
day. Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.4, on May 5, 2017, Ms. Phipps timely filed a notice of
appeal to challenge the Court's denial of her Motion to Suppress Evidence.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the Magistrate Court erred in denying Ms. Phipps's Motion to Suppress Evidence.

2
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Magistrate Court Erred by Denying the Motion to Suppress.

A. Introduction.

The Magistrate Court erred in denying Ms. Phipps's Motion to Suppress because the
parole search was based on a parolee's consent via waiver, and officers exceeded the scope of
that consent by unlawfully seizing Ms. Phipps.
B. Standard of Review.

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, the court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App.
1996).
C. The Magistrate Court Erred by Denying Ms. Phipps's Motion to Suppress.
The Magistrate Court erred by denying Ms. Phipps's Motion to Suppress because she was
unreasonably seized without an exception to the warrant requirement. Article I, § 17 of the
Constitution of the State of Idaho and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons or property. State v.

Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644, 181 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008). Both warrantless seizures
and warrantless intrusions into a home by government agents are presumptively unreasonable.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v.
Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 98, 57 P.3d 807, 809 (Ct. App. 2002). This presumption may be
overcome by the State demonstrating one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirements apply. Stewart, 145 Idaho at 641; State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,431,925 P.2d.
1125, 1130 (Ct.App. 1996).
3
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If an exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, evidence obtained during the
unconstitutional search or seizure is considered "fruit of the poisonous tree", and the government
carries the burden of proof to show that the unlawful police conduct did not taint the evidence.

State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 537, 5 P.3d 993, 998 (Ct.App.2000). If the causal connection
between the unlawful conduct and evidence seized has not been broken by "means sufficiently
distinguishable to purge the primary taint", the evidence is not admissible and must be
suppressed in a criminal prosecution of the person whose rights were violated. Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471,488, 83 S. Ct. 407,417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); State v. Cardenas,
143 Idaho 903, 910, 155 P.3d 704, 711 (Ct. App. 2006); Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 98.
1. Ms. Phipps was seized in the absence of a warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement.
Seizures, which occur whenever a police officer "accosts an individual and restrains [her]
freedom to walk away ... ", are presumptively unreasonable when conducted without a warrant.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The restraint on the
individual's liberty can be effectuated by means of physical force or show of authority. Stewart,
145 Idaho at 644. The inquiry is whether, considering all surrounding circumstances, a
reasonable person would think that she was not free to leave or not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about her business. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct.
1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,479, 988 P.2d 700, 705
(Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho has specifically recognized that the Court has not extended the authority to detain
individuals on a premises being searched pursuant to a warrant to include searches based on
probation conditions. State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 916, 155 P.3d 712, 717 (Ct. App. 2007).
While there is an absence of Idaho case law directly on point, Ms. Phipps asserts that the Court
4
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erred in likening a parole search to a search based upon a warrant. Specifically, Ms. Phipps
asserts that, while a warrant based on probable cause establishes a nexus between the premises
described in the warrant and its occupants, such nexus is not present where a search is based on
consent via waiver as a condition of parole or probation. Here, officers extended the parolee's
consent to search his residence for verification purposes to operate as consent to detain Ms.
Phipps in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Where a search is not based on a warrant and it
exceeds the scope of the consent by which it is permissible, suppression is appropriate.

A. Ms. Phipps was seized without reasonable suspicion.
Not all seizures are unreasonable; even where there is a seizure, it may be sustained
without affront to the Fourth Amendment when it is appropriately justified. State v. Martinez,
129 Idaho 426,429,925 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 1996). An investigative detention oflimited
duration, commonly known as a Terry stop, falls under a judicially created exception to the
probable cause requirement; it need only be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479. Suspicion is reasonable if the officer's awareness of
specific, articulable facts and his rational inferences therefrom justify a suspicion that the
individual at issue has committed or is about to commit a crime. Martinez, 129 Idaho at 430. The
reasonableness of the officer's suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances
at the time of the stop. State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12, 878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct. App. 1994)
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 16 P.3d 931 (2000).
In this case, officers conceded, and the Magistrate Court found, that reasonable suspicion
did not exist. Ms. Phipps does not question these factual findings. Without reasonable suspicion,
Ms. Phipps's detention cannot be sustained under Terry.

5
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B. Officers were not executing a search warrant based upon probable cause.
When executing a search warrant for drugs or contraband founded on probable cause,
police have the limited authority to detain individuals who are occupants of a premises while a
proper search is conducted. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595, 69
L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981 ). The Summers court reasoned that, because a detached and neutral
magistrate had determined that police had probable cause that someone in the home was
committing a crime, the occupant's connection to that home provided officers with "an easily
identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a
detention of that occupant." Id. at 704. Additionally, the court looked to other relevant factors,
including preventing flight in the event incriminating evidence was found, minimizing the risk of
harm to officers, and the orderly completion of the search of a residence as facilitated by
occupants. Id. at 702.
Later, in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299 (2005), the
court held that detention of occupants may even include reasonable force where appropriate. The

Muehler court found that the occupant's detention in handcuffs for the length of the search was
consistent with Summers' holding that officers executing a search warrant have the authority "to
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Id. (quoting Summers,
452 U.S. at 705). Specifically, the court reasoned that "[b]ecause a warrant existed to search the
premises and Mena was an occupant of the premises at the time of the search", her detention was
reasonable under Summers. Id. See also Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reiterating that

Summers authorizes the detention of any individual who is present when a valid search warrant
is being executed).

6
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Finally, in Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) overruled on other grounds
by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012), the court held that detention of the
occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance search was not a violation of the
occupants' clearly established constitutional rights. In that case, a probationer's parents,
grandmother (who was suffering from cancer), sister, and

nephew were detained

pursuant to a compliance search. Id., 574 F.3d at 1171. The Sanchez court determined that the
three justifications underlying the Muehler decision - preventing the flight of criminals, ensuring
officer safety, and facilitating orderly completion of valid searches - were present in every valid
home search. Sanchez, 574 F.3d at 1174. Further, the court found that the evidence sufficient to
persuade a judicial officer to issue a warrant was akin to parole and probation conditions
justifying a home search, holding that both are categorically sufficient to justify the requisite
invasion of privacy. Id. Finally, the court reasoned that a search warrant is not the only basis for
heightened suspicion that a home's occupants might be involved in criminal activity: '"parolees
... are more likely [than ordinary citizens] to commit future criminal offenses."' Id. (quoting

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 844, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2195, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006)
(quoting Pennsylvania Bd. ofProbation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,365, 118 S.Ct. 2014,
141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998)).

Where a valid warrant is present, Idaho case law is analogous: in the execution of a
search warrant at a residence, police have the right to detain, during the duration of the search,
those individuals who are occupants of the residence. State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643,646, 51
P.3d 457, 460 (Ct. App. 2002). The articulable and individualized suspicion to justify this seizure
is found in the issuance of a search warrant by a judicial officer based upon probable cause,
which establishes a nexus between the individual and the criminal activity giving rise to the

7
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warrant. Id On the other hand, individuals found on the premises at the inception of the search
whose identity and connection to the premises are unknown may be detained only as long as
necessary to determine those facts and to protect the safety of those present during the detention.
Id.
See State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643, 51 P.3d 457 (Ct. App. 2002) (where unknown
individual arrived at premises being searched pursuant to a warrant, the individual was wearing a
fanny pack, the individual gave a questionable explanation for being at the premises so late at
night, and the officer was aware that some individuals were coming to the premises to trade
weapons for drugs, detention of individual to determine his identity and relationship to the house
was appropriate). See also State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 701 P.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985) (while
police could ask individual arriving at premises during probation search who he was and where
he lived, they were not entitled to detain him until the point that reasonable suspicion was
aroused due to his responses lacking "the ring of truth"); State v. Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878, 820
P.2d 1235 (Ct. App. 1991) (during probation search, probationers and overnight guest described
by confidential informant as user and dealer of methamphetamine were detained, but other guest
was allowed to leave).
In this instance, officers were aware that Ms. Phipps was a visitor, not a resident. (Rep.
Tr. 19:22-23). Thus, the justifications underlying the detention in Muehler are hardly plausible
here: where an occupant does not live at a parolee's residence, it is doubtful that she is going to
be in flight due to incriminating evidence uncovered on the premises - it's not a natural place for
her to store things. Along the same lines, a non-resident is unlikely to be able to help with officer
completion of the search, as it is improbable that she has keys or special access to locked doors
or containers.

8
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Additionally, officers were not searching the premises pursuant to a warrant, and Ms.
Phipps was not suspected of criminal activity either on the basis of her own actions or
information provided by a confidential informant. (Id. 38: 9-15).Rather, they were conducting a
residence check on a parolee. (Id. 9:13-14). In accepting the terms of parole, the individual
residing at the premises at issue agreed to a condition allowing the probation officer and parole
agent to check his residence. Consequently, it was not criminal activity or suspicion that gave
rise to the search, but consent.
C. Law enforcement entered the apartment based on the parolee's consent to the terms
of his parole, and the scope of this consent did not contemplate Ms. Phipps's
detention.

When voluntarily granted by someone with authority, consent is one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S.Ct.
988,993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242,249 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,219, 93 S. Ct.
2041, 2044, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057
(2003). This exception encompasses Fourth Amendment waivers given as a condition of parole,
which operate as consents to search. State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364,370,347 P.3d 1025,
1031 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied (May 21, 2015) (citing State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,
208,207 P.3d 182, 184 (2009); State v. Gawron, 223 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297
(1987); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359,364, 972 P.2d 737, 742 (Ct. App. 1998)). Consent
obtained as a condition of parole justifies searching a parolee's residence. State v. Buhler, 137
Idaho 685, 687, 52 P.3d 329, 331 (Ct. App. 2002). The State has the burden of demonstrating
consent by a preponderance of the evidence, and it must show that the consent was not the result
of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. State v. Santana, 394 P.3d 122, 127 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2017).
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In addition to protecting the public, parole serves to achieve the parolee's rehabilitation
and reintegration into society. See generally, David T. Stanley, Prisoners Among Us: The
Problem of Parole (1976), p. 1-2. The condition of probation that a defendant consent to

warrantless searches by his probation officer is a supervisorial procedure related to his
reformation and rehabilitation; "to determine not only whether he disobeys a law, but also
whether he obeys the law." Gawron, 112 Idaho at 842-43, 736 P.2d at 1296-97 (quoting People
v. Kern, 71 Cal.Rptr. 105,264 Cal.App.2d 962 (1968)). These searches may be, and often are,

unexpected and unprovoked. Id.
Nonetheless, a search based on consent must conform to the limitations placed upon the
right granted by the consent. Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 370. The standard for measuring the scope
of consent for Fourth Amendment purposes is that of objective reasonableness. Id. When consent
is based on a Fourth Amendment waiver as provided in court-ordered parole or probation
conditions, the plain language of the condition itself governs even where the purposes of parole
or probation would be better advanced by a less restrictive interpretation; "probationers'
expectation of privacy is merely diminished, not obliterated." State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 752,
250 P.3d 796, 803 (Ct. App. 2011).
Compare State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841,736 P.2d 1295 (1987) (search of probationer's

home while he was not present, pursuant to condition of probation permitting search "at any time
and any place by any law enforcement officer", was upheld where he had consented in advance
by signing the order in which the term appeared) and State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745,250 P.3d
796 (Ct. App. 2011) (where a probation condition required probationer to submit to search "at
the request of' an officer, search of his residence and shed behind the residence while
probationer was not home exceeded scope of consent). See also State v. Santana, 162 Idaho 79,
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394 P.3d 122, 126 (Ct. App. 2017) (Fourth Amendment waiver created by probation officer six
weeks after sentencing was not a valid condition of probation where probationer did not receive
notice at sentencing, as probationer did not have opportunity to consider the term prior to
accepting probation).
Further, the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. State v. Peters, 130 Idaho
960,962,950 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Ct. App. 1997). Accordingly, the parolee's consent means his
own expectation of privacy is diminished, not the privacy of any and all places with which he is
associated, whether covered by the parole condition or not. United States v. Grandberry, 730
F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2013). The court has recognized that a parolee's consent to search his
residence intrudes upon the Fourth Amendment privacy interests of third persons, inasmuch as
this authority extends to areas which are jointly controlled. State v. Misner, 135 Idaho 277, 280,
16 P.3d 953, 956 (Ct. App. 2000). However, Idaho does not align itself with "guilt by
association" reasoning. State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 834, 718 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Ct. App.
1986). Accordingly, the court has failed to extend such parole agreements to validate warrantless
searches and seizures of the property under the exclusive authority of third parties, even where
the third party resides on the same premises. See State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho 961,969,277 P.3d
408,416 (Ct. App. 2012)) (probationer lacked actual or apparent authority to consent to search of
third party's private room in shared residence).
Finally, while Idaho has not conclusively addressed the issue of detaining individuals
present during probation searches, the court has found the reasoning of Joubert v. State, 926 P.2d
1191 (Alaska Ct.App.1996), persuasive. Turek, 150 Idaho at 752. In Joubert, the court upheld
the requirement for a request to search the probationer's residence prior to actual search, finding
that the purposes of probation could be outweighed by other societal interests. 926 P.2d at 1193.
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Namely, the court criticized the officers essentially placing the probationer's daughter and her
children under arrest (directing her to sit on the couch, instructing her to not answer the phone,
and questioning her regarding probationer's drug use) during the pendency of the probation
search. Id., 926 P.2d at 1192. The court held that probationers and parolees do not give up all
their Fourth Amendment rights simply because they are on probation, as doing so would
diminish Fourth Amendment protection for the family and friends willing to help them
reintegrate into society. Id.
Similarly, based on her mere presence on the premises, Ms. Phipps was ordered into the
living room, questioned, and detained during the compliance search. (Rep. Tr. 11: 20-22; 29:1518). A third party cannot vicariously assert standing for a violation of Ms. Phipps's rights, and
third party consent for the same is likewise ineffective. Ms. Phipps did not agree to the terms of
the parolee's release. To allow the parolee's consent to extend to Ms. Phipps would ignore her
protection not only under the United States Constitution, but also under the Idaho Constitution.
2. Based on Idaho's long-standing jurisprudence, federal precedent is not consistent
with the protections afforded by our state constitution.
The Idaho Constitution can provide greater protection than its federal counterpart. State v.
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988, 842 P.2d 660, 667 (1992). In determining the parameters of
Idaho's own constitutional provisions, the court seriously considers federal law, but it will only
adopt federal precedent to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the protections afforded by
the state constitution. Id. It is important that state protections are not diminished by permanently
pervading adoption of federal exceptions to those protections. See Id., 122 Idaho at 988-989.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the state constitution affords greater protection
in such areas as the exclusionary rule, the reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers
dialed, and the definition of curtilage. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981; State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho
12
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746, 760 P.2d 1162 (1988); State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462, 943 P.2d 52 (1997). This enhanced
protection is based on the uniqueness of our state, our constitution, and our long-standing
jurisprudence. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,472, 20 P.3d 5, 8 (2001).

See Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (rejecting the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
the court held that exclusionary rule is properly directed at warrant-issuing process itself,
deterrence of police misconduct was not only justification for exclusion, and admission of
illegally obtained evidence was additional constitutional violation); Webb, 130 Idaho 462 (in
addition to considering curtilage boundary factors set forth in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), court must take into consideration the differences in
custom and terrain within different areas of the state); Thompson, 114 Idaho 746 (holding that
numbers dialed from a private telephone are protected by Art. I, § 17).
Idaho's adoption of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sanchez, 574 F.3d 1169, would
significantly deprive law-abiding citizens of their liberty by unreasonably equating probation or
parole searches grounded in compliance alone to premises search warrants supported by probable
cause. Idaho's stance towards the exclusionary rule demonstrates that the state does not easily
dispense with the requirement for a valid warrant: while the Supreme Court in United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), reasoned against penalizing an
officer for the magistrate's error in issuing a subsequently invalidated warrant, Idaho places a
premium on encouraging compliance with the constitutional requirement of probable cause by
allowing invalid warrants to support suppression, thus lessening the chances "that innocent
citizens will have their homes broken into and ransacked by the police because of warrants
issued upon incomplete or inaccurate information." Guzman, 122 Idaho at 998. Elevating
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probation or parolee consent to the level of a warrant based on probable cause diminishes the
significance of a valid warrant in a way that is inharmonious with Idaho jurisprudence.
Further, because Ms. Phipps was not suspected of criminal activity, was not on a
premises subject to a search warrant based on probable cause, and had not consented to waive
her constitutional rights, her detention by parole and probation officers amounted to the broad
and unsuspected government incursion contemplated in Thompson. 114 Idaho at 749. The
Thompson court was persuaded by Justice Stewart's dissent in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979), in which he opined it was insufficient to conclude "that
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed because the caller assumes the
risk that the telephone company will disclose them to the police." Thompson, 114 Idaho at 750.
Such extensive intrusions are not dependent on risks individuals are presumed to accept when
imparting information to third parties, but on the risks an individual should be forced to assume
in a free and open society. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. 747-748, Marshall, J., dissenting).
Similarly, it is unreasonable to infer that Ms. Phipps assumed the risk ofloss of privacy and
liberty by merely associating with a parolee who had consented to cooperate with police or
parole agents. A person's mere proximity to others independently suspected of criminal activity,
or her coincidental presence at a place during the inception of a search, does not divest her of her
constitutional protections. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338,342, 62 L. Ed. 2d
238 (1979). Moore v. Vega, 371 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2004), is also persuasive: "[b]ecause
plaintiff is not a parolee, she cannot be subjected to the same burdens upon her privacy, and the
departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements allowed with respect to
parolees are not justified for her".
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3. Adoption of Sanchez would be harmful to Idaho's collective wellbeing and the goals
of its parole and probation programs.
Finally, detaining third parties pursuant to parolee or probationer consent is not consistent
with reformation and rehabilitation. Simply put, almost all state prisoners are released - and most
are released to parole supervision. See Timothy Hughes and Dorothy James Wilson, Reentry

Trends in the United States, Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1 Extending the
already overzealous conditions of parole to intrude on the liberty of a third party further
stigmatizes those individuals the state purportedly desires to reintegrate into society. See

generally James M. Binnall, They Released Me from My Cage ... but They Still Keep Me
Handcuffed: A Parolee's Reaction to Samson v. California, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 541, 553
(2007). The inefficacy of Idaho's supervision and diversion programs has come to light in recent
years; increased prison population coupled with stagnant recidivism rates gave rise to the
adoption of the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, designed to reduce recidivism and crime rates
through policy reform. Senate Bill 1357 (2014) (codified by addition and amendment to LC.
Chapter 25, Title 19). 2 Even still, Idaho struggles to slow this "revolving door" of individuals
returning to prison following failed probation or parole. Idaho Department of Corrections,

Justice Reinvestment in Idaho: Impact at 30 Months, Report to Legislature, February 1, 2017. 3
Adopting the interpretation articulated in Sanchez would alienate Idaho even further from
its goal of diverting offenders from prison beds via successful completion of community
supervision based on treatment, support, and mentoring. See Id. Community integration would be
grievously hampered if community members felt probation conditions were contagious. By
allowing this parolee's consent to search his residence to extend to a seizure of Ms. Phipps

1

Available at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/reentry.htm.
Available at https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2014/legislation/S 1357 .pdf.
3
Available at https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/docurnent/2017 jri_impact_report.

2
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absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the state would further isolate the parolee. It
already prohibits his association with other parolees; this measure would simultaneously provide
a disincentive for any law-abiding citizen to establish a meaningful relationship with him, as it
would subject her to a search without a warrant or suspicion for the duration of the parolee's
agreement. See generally Liam Duffy, State Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Warrantless
and Suspicionless Search of Parolee's Hotel Room by A General Law Enforcement Official
Violates Article i, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. State v. Ochoa, 792 N, 43 Rutgers L.J. 651,
666 (2013). The situation is a universal loss: not only is the parolee further estranged, Idaho's
collective wellbeing suffers through the privacy intrusions of its citizens and the state's increased
failure to positively impact its offenders so they will lead pro-social and crime-free lives.

CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Magistrate Court erred in its determination that the detention of Ms.
Phipps was not unlawful. For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Phipps respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the Magistrate Court's decision denying her Motion to Suppress, and grant her
Motion to Suppress.
DATED this

2Lf

day of July, 2017.

THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY

BY:

TY!JiiiA~
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
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COMES NOW, the State of Idaho Respondent, through Eileen McGovern Paul of the Office
of the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney-Criminal Division, and Appellant Attorney, Tyler R. Naftz and ·
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State largely concurs with Defendant's statement of the case except to clarify that the
statement or question by Officer Kuebler regarding the arrival of the K-9 to the residence was not a
question put directly to Ms. Phipps but was made generally to the parties present. (App. Tr. 12:612:10; 33:4-33:13) Further, the Probation Officers were familiar with Ms. Phipps as she had been
present at the home during prior visits, so had a more intimate relationship with the home than being
simply a visitor. (App. Tr. 22:3-22:9; 33:14-33:21).

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the Magistrate Court's denial of Ms. Phipp's Motion to Suppress was justified.

ARGUMENT

I.

Both U.S. Supreme Court case law and Idaho Supreme Court Support Detention of
Occupants on the Premises Subject to Search

The US Supreme Court in Muehler v. Mena, referencing Michigan v. Summers, held that officers
executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority "to detain the occupants of the premises
while a proper search is conducted." Id., at 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587. Such detentions
are appropriate [ ... ] because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and
because the justifications for detention are substantial. [ ... ] Against this incremental intrusion, we
posited three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide substantial justification for detaining
an occupant: "preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found"; "minimizing

the risk of harm to the officers"; and facilitating "the orderly completion of the search," as
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detainees' "self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the
use of force." Id., at 702-703, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct. 2587. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98,

125 S. Ct. 1465, 1469-1470, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 306-307, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2755, *9-10, 73
U.S.L.W. 4211, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 183 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2005) (emphasis added)
Notably, the Muehler court went as far as to "conclude that the detention of Mena in handcuffs
during the search was reasonable." Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 1470-1471,
161 L. Ed. 2d 299,308, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2755, *13-14, 73 U.S.L.W. 4211, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S
183 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2005) That is more force than was used in the instant case. 1
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court rulings, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed the
analogous and logical extension from detaining occupants of a residence pursuant to a search warrant
to support the conclusion "that officers may constitutionally detain the occupants of a home during a
parole or probation compliance search. [ ... ] [W]e conclude that any such detention was not a
violation of the Plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional rights." Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d
1169, 1173, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 16897, (9th Cir. Cal. July 30, 2009)
The Sanchez Court confirmed there is no meaningful distinction between a search authorized by a
search warrant and a search authorized by a probation or parole agreement, elucidating the two
following premises:
First, the three justifications underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Muehler
appear to be present in every valid home search, whether or not the search is supported
by a warrant. Either way, "the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight"
and "the justifications for detention are substantial": the law should always be
concerned to prevent the flight of criminals, ensure officer safety, and facilitate
orderly completions of valid searches--warrant or no warrant. See Muehler, 544
U.S. at 98. (emphasis added)
Second, any reason to think the presence of a warrant was relevant to the
outcome in Muehler is equally present in warrantless probation and parole
compliance searches.[ .. .]There is no question[ ... ] that parole and probation
conditions are also categorically sufficient to justify the invasion of privacy entailed
by a home search. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843,847, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165
L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006) (where a parolee has agreed to submit to warrantless searches as
"a condition ofrelease," subsequent warrantless, "suspicionless search[es] by a law
enforcement officer [do] not offend the Fourth Amendment"); see also Motley. 432
F.3d 1072 (same). (emphasis added)
1

It is worth noting that Defendant, though detained, was not in custody at the time she advised law enforcement she had a
meth pipe in her backpack. This case is analogous to State v. Jones, 2010 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 105, *4-6, 2010 WL
9586558 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2010)
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Based on these analogous concerns, the Sanchez court confirmed: "Just as in a search pursuant to
a search warrant, therefore, "it is constitutionally reasonable to require [the occupant of a home] to
remain while officers of the law execute a valid [probation compliance] search." Summers, 452 U.S.
at 704-05.
Further, just as a search warrant "gives police reason to suspect that its occupants are involved in
criminal activity." [ ... ]The very same concern applies here: as the Supreme Court has previously
explained, "'parolees ... are more likely [than ordinary citizens] to commit future criminal offenses."'
Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,
365, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998)).
Thus, the Sanchez court concluded the detention in that case was constitutionally reasonable
where: "there is no reason to conclude that Muehler means "officers may take reasonable action to
secure the premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search" only when the
search is conducted pursuant to a search warrant but not to a probation or parole compliance check."
See Rettele, 127 S. Ct. at 1992. To the contrary, Muehler's underlying justifications permitting
detentions during home searches apply with full force here, notwithstanding the absence of a search
warrant. Just as in Muehler, "the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight" while "the
justifications for detention are substantial." Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98. (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at
701-05). Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169, 1174-1175, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 16897, *10-14 (9th
Cir. Cal. July 30, 2009)
In the instant case, all the same concerns apply addressed by the Sanchez Court: the flight of
criminals, ensuring officer safety, and facilitating the orderly completions of valid searches.
Probation officers entered the probationer's residence to conduct a valid search pursuant to consent
by the relevant probationer. Ms. Phipps was not only present in the residence, but was known to
probation officers as a regular visitor of the house. Thus, her "connection to the home" was more
significant than suggested by Defendant's brief. (App. Brief p. 6).
Regardless, even if Ms. Phipps had simply been a casual visitor, the Sanchez factors would still
be relevant: officers had a legitimate interest in ensuring other occupants of the residence who may be
involved in criminal activity did not flee - as is clearly at issue in this case where Ms. Phipps, in fact,

was involved in criminal activity. Officers had a legitimate interest in ensuring their own safetywhich would could be seriously endangered if occupants of a residence subject to a legitimate search
are free to leave and arrive at their leisure - especially in circumstances where occupants of a
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residence may be more likely to be involved in criminal activity and be particularly hostile to law
enforcement. Finally, the officers in this case had an interest in conducting an orderly search - a
purpose which would be severely hampered if occupants of the residence were free to come and go.
As stated by the Muehler and Sanchez courts: the additional intrusion is slight while the legal
justifications for detention are substantial.
The practical goals of officer safety is recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Kester
stating: "[w ]hen police detain individuals in the execution of a search warrant, the articulable and
individualized suspicion to support the detention is found in the issuance of a search warrant by a
judicial officer based upon probable cause." That court concluded further "the late hour of the search
and the concerns for officer safety, following the rationales in Summers and Glaser, the police were
justified in stopping Kester long enough to determine his identity and his connection to the premises.
Accordingly, we hold that the initial detention of Kester was justified. State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643,
646, 51 P.3d 457,460, 2002 Ida. App. LEXIS 53, *6-7 (Idaho Ct. App. June 20, 2002) Again, though
in the context of a search warrant, the practical concerns referenced by Kester court are analgous.

II.

The Idaho Case Law Relied upon by Defendant does Not Create a Distinction
between the Supreme Court Holdings and the Constitutional Protections
Contemplated by Idaho Law.

Defendant relies on Reynolds to assert Idaho has specifically "not extended the authority to detain
individuals on a premises being searched pursuant to a warrant to include searches based on
probation conditions". This is not an accurate characterization of what Reynolds holds because the
facts are so distinguishable - particularly in that the defendant in that matter was NOT on the
premises subject to search pursuant to the probation/parole agreement in that matter. What Reynolds
does do is recognize the basis for the comparison between detaining and searching individuals on a
premises pursuant to a search warrant and a probation/parole search.
To this end, the Reynolds court considered the State's argument in that case that relied on the
U.S. Supreme court Summer's decision (referenced above) and a California appellate decision that
appropriately extended the reasoning of Summers to hold that an officer acted reasonably in detaining
individuals leaving the premises of a residence subject to a warrantless probation search. See People
v. Matelski, 82 Cal. App. 4th 837, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
The Reynolds court then recognized its own case was "clearly distinguishable" finding that when
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law enforcement arrived the defendant in that matter was in an outside area that adjoined the
defendant's property. Law enforcement did not see him leave from the relevant probationer's
property, or ever be on probationer's property. Officers detained him after he exited his own property.
Thus, the Reynolds case is inapplicable in the instant matter where Ms. Phipps was on the property
appropriately subject to search by officers. State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 915-916, 155 P.3d 712,
716-717, 2007 Ida. App. LEXIS 17, *12-14 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2007)
Defendant provides a long list ofldaho Cases in order to make the argument that the parolee's
consent to search does not extend to, or bind, Ms. Phipps. Turek, et seq., confirms a parolee's
expectation in privacy is diminished. Peters and Grandberry essentially confirm that it's the
probationer's/parolee's own residence which is subject to search- which is what is at issue in this
case. Misner relates to areas of a residence which are "jointly controlled" with a third-party - that is
not relevant in this matter. Vinton reference "guilty by association" which misses the point that the
detention is to ensure officer safety and orderly searches, not punishment of bystanders. Robinson
relates to "property under the exclusive authority of third parties" who reside on same premises again, not relevant in this matter. Joubert relates to a search that was determined inappropriate
because the Defendant/probationer in that matter was not at home at the time of the search to "submit
to the search" upon the request of his probation officer - again, fundamentally distinguishable in this
case where the probationer was home and did submit to the search.
Defendant references Zfilm during which officers were allowed to question individual who was
arriving at the residence but not detain him - again, distinguishable as Ms. Phipps was on the
premises at the time the search initiated. In Bulgin law enforcement permitted an occupant to leave
who was not described by a confidential informant as a user or dealer - this case shows that law
enforcement has discretion when determining when and who to detain during a valid search of a
residence. Officers don't have to detain people on scene but they should have the ability to do so as
circumstances dictate.
Similarly, Defendant's argument that applying the Sanchez ruling in Idaho will serve to
"significantly deprive law-abiding citizen of their liberty" or that individuals will lose "privacy and
liberty by merely associating with a parolee", again, misses the point of the detention in this matter
(and similar matters)- officer safety and orderly searches. There is a very narrow window during
which the detention of an occupant in a residence will be relevant: during a valid search pursuant to
probation or parole, and only at the probationer/parolee's residence, whiles/he is present. That the
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authority for the search is based on consent by the probationer pursuant to his or her status as a
probationer does not alter the functional equivalence between a search of residence based on a search
warrant and the search of a residence based on probation status when the purpose of the detention is
safety and order during the search.
Defendant argues the "scope of [probationer's] consent does not contemplate Ms. Phipps
detention". This is much like arguing that the scope of a search warrant does not contemplate the
detention of occupants who may be on the premises at the time the warrant is executed. Simply
because they are not specifically "contemplated" doesn't mean such occupants must be ignored by
law enforcement once they are on scene. The potential for unexpected persons to be on scene at a
residential search is always "contemplated". The Sanchez factors of offender flight, officer safety and
orderly searches do not disappear because law enforcement is on scene pursuant to a probation search
rather than a search warrant. To hold otherwise would create an arbitrary, dangerous distinction.
In the instant matter the relevant probationer was home and submitted to the relevant search
pursuant to the consent he had provided to search of his residence as a term and condition of his
probation. Ms. Phipps, an occupant of the residence at the time, was appropriately subject to
detention primarily for officer safety, as well as to ensure an orderly search. Again, the additional
intrusion is slight while the legal justifications for detention are substantial.

III.

It is Good Public Policy to Place a Premium on Officer Safety and Order Searches
and Investigations

Finally, Defendant argues adoption of Sanchez would somehow undermine the goals of probation
and parole by hampering relationships and community support of those subject to its terms,
motivating estrangement and, presumably recidivism. On the contrary, to fail to adopt Sanchez would
undermine the safe, orderly execution of home searches. Such a policy would place significant
hardship on the probation officers and police tasked with ensuring compliant probationers.
Ironically, Defendant references "[t]he inefficiacy ofldaho's supervision and diversion
programs" as a factor in "increased prison population [and] stagnant recidivism rates". Certainly
Idaho's supervision programs would not become more efficient if probation officers and law
enforcement were not able to ensure safe, orderly home searches- if they were subject to individuals
coming and going during a search that may evolve into an investigation - as it did in the instant case.
If probation officers and law enforcement did not feel they could conduct probation searches in a safe
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and orderly manner, the likelihood is that the quality of supervision would diminish. The result would
be higher crime and relapse rates due to the inability of officers to effectively monitor probationers increasing jail and prison populations.
In short, Sanchez represents good public policy and is consistent with case law from the U.S.
Supreme court, the 9th Circuit, and Idaho.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully requests that this court, Consistent with all relevant precedent, affirm the
decision of the Magistrate Court, denying the Motion to Suppress and finding that the detention of
Ms. Phipps was justified.
DATED this 6th day of September, 2017.

Deputy/Assistant City Attorney
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COMES NOW, Eileen J. McGovern of the Office of the Coeur d'Alene City AttorneyCriminal Division and Tyler R. Naftz of the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office,
and hereby moves the Court for an Order vacating that Status Hearing presently set for March 15,
2018 at 3:00 p.m. and setting a hearing for oral argument by the parties in the normal course, at the
court's convenience.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2018.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.
KARI JANAE PIDPPS,
Defendant/Appellant.

________________
I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-16-22188
Memorandum Decision and
Order on Appeal

INTRODUCTION

Defendant conditionally pied guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia following
the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant appeals the denial of her motion
to suppress, contending that the warrantless seizure of her person was unlawful and
without legal justification and that the physical evidence obtained and the statements made
to law enforcement were the result of the unlawful seizure.
II.

FACTS

Probation officers performed a residence check on a felony parolee. Tr., pp. 9-10.
The parolee consented to a search of his residence pursuant to the standard conditions of
parole.

See id. at 10-11, 29.

Probation officers had no suspicion of any criminal

wrongdoing or parole violations when they arrived to perform the residence check. Id. at
15-16.
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When the officers arrived, Defendant was present in the residence along with the
parolee. Id. at 10-11. The parties stipulated to the fact that Defendant was detained at the
time probation officers entered into the residence to conduct the search.

Id. at 5-7.

Defendant was not on felony probation at the time of the search and there were no warrants
for her arrest. Id. at 37, 50. Although there was no testimony about whether Defendant
was a resident of the apartment, the State's briefing acknowledges that Defendant was a
visitor to the residence. See Respondent's Brief, p. 3; Appellant's Brief, p. 1; see also
Objection to Motion to Suppress, p. 1. However, the probation officers on scene were
familiar with Defendant from her presence during prior visits. Id. at 19, 33.
After drugs were found elsewhere in the residence, local law enforcement was
called. Id. at 11-12. Probation Officer Kuebler asked the individuals present if there was
anything else in the apartment and notified them that a drug dog would be on scene if need
be, at which point Defendant stated that she had a meth pipe in her backpack. Id. at 12.
Defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence found in her backpack and her
statements to law enforcement, contending that she was unlawfully seized during the
residence check. Defendant argues that the physical evidence and her statements to law
enforcement were obtained as the result of her illegal seizure. Defendant's motion to
suppress was denied, and she now appeals.

III.

STANDARDS

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on
a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of
fact that are supported by substantial evidence but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916
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P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App.
1999).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures of persons or property. Searches or detentions conducted without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 45455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 575-76 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho
125, 129, 44 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Ct.App.2002). The State may overcome this presumption by
demonstrating that the search or seizure fell within a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. State v.

Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,431,925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct.App.1996).
A seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment occurs when an officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, restrains a citizen's liberty. State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct.App.1999). A seizure may take the form of either
an arrest or an investigative detention. An investigative detention is a seizure of limited
duration to investigate suspected criminal activity and does not offend the Fourth
Amendment if the facts available to the officer at the time gave rise to reasonable suspicion
to believe that criminal activity was afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479, 988 P.2d at 705; State v. Dice, 126 Idaho
595, 599, 887 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 347, 815
P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct.App.1991).
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Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the
exclusionary rule, which requires unlawfully seized evidence to be excluded. E.g., Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004). The exclusionary rule requires the

suppression of both "primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or
seizure, ... but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or
'fruit of the poisonous tree.' "Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S.Ct. 3380,
82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct.
266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939)); accord, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811-12, 203 P.3d at 121011.

IV.

ANALYSIS

This appeal raises the issue of whether law enforcement may detain individuals
found on the premises where a lawful parole (or probation) search is conducted pursuant to
the parolee's condition of parole requiring the parolee to consent to searches by law
enforcement.

Idaho appellate courts have not yet addressed this issue.

In State v.

Reynolds, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized this unresolved issue, but the Court of

Appeals decided Reynolds on other grounds. See State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 916,
155 P.3d 712 (Ct. App. 2007).
In the context of a search pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral and detached
judicial officer, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have held that
police are allowed to detain individuals present during the search, even without other
reasonable suspicion that those individuals are involved in criminal activity. Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2595, 69 L.Ed.2d 340, 351 (1981); State v.
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Kester, 137 Idaho 643, 646, 51 P.3d 457, 460 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho

296, 47 P.3d 1266 (Ct.App.2002).
In Summers, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[t]he connection of an occupant to
that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining
that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant." Summers, 452
U.S. at 703--04. The Court further reasoned that in a search of a private home, ''the
additional intrusion caused by detention is slight" while ''the justifications for detention are
substantial." Summers, 452 U.S. at 701--05. Those justifications include (1) "preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found"; (2) "minimizing the risk of harm
to the officers"; and (3) "facilitating the orderly completion of the search ... [while]
avoid[ing] the use of force." Id. at 702-03; see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125
S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (confirming Summers's holding and also authorizing
reasonable force to detain occupants based on the circumstances).
In Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) (overruled on other grounds
by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012)), the Ninth Circuit held that
detention of the occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance search was
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, relying heavily on Summers and Meuhler.
Sanchez, like Meuhler, was a civil § 1983 case, but it evaluated the same Fourth

Amendment principles applicable here - whether it was reasonable to seize the occupants
of a residence while an authorized probation/parole residence check is performed.
In the case of a valid search warrant, a judge has necessarily determined that there
is probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity may be found in that
location. As reasoned in Summers, the probable cause determination provides a nexus
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between an individual's presence at the location and the suspected criminal activity,
rendering detention of individuals present reasonable during the execution of the warrant:
The existence of a search warrant, however, also provides an objective
justification for the detention. A judicial officer has determined that police
have probable cause to believe that someone in the home is committing a
crime. Thus a neutral magistrate rather than an officer in the field has
made the critical determination that the police should be given a special
authorization to thrust themselves into the privacy of a home. The
connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily
identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal
activity justifies a detention of that occupant.

Summers, 452 U.S. at 703-04.
However, that same nexus between an individual's presence and suspected criminal
activity does not exist when law enforcement arrives at a parolee's residence to perform a
routine search pursuant to standard conditions of parole rather than pursuant to probable
cause. Although the Sanchez court reasoned that that "parolees ... are more likely [than
ordinary citizens] to commit future criminal offenses," (see Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d
at 1175 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 853, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d
250 (2006))), this rationale should not extend to justify seizures of individuals who are not
parolees nor residents of the home but are merely present at a parolee's residence when
law enforcement arrives.
It would be unreasonable to subject an individual to searches and seizures by law
enforcement merely based on their association with a parolee and would run counter to the
policy goals of parolees' reintegration into society. In discussing whether a probation
officer must actually request permission to search or may enter unannounced, the Idaho
Court of Appeals recognized that the rights of persons associated with a probationer or
parolee and the policy objectives of parole and probation should be considered,
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One might reasonably argue that the purposes of probation would be better
advanced if [the condition] were interpreted as the State suggests-to
allow probation officers to conduct unrestricted, unannounced searches of
a probationer's residence. However, other societal interests support [the
probationer's] interpretation of [the condition]. As the supreme court
recognized in Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977), there is a
price to be paid for adopting a rule that probationers and parolees give up
all of their Fourth Amendment rights simply because they are on probation
or parole:
Fourth amendment protection will be diminished not only for
parolees, but also for the family and friends with whom the parolee
might be living. Those bystanders may find themselves subject to
warrantless searches only because they are good enough to shelter
the parolee, and they may therefore be less willing to help him-a
sadly ironic result in a system designed to encourage reintegration
into society.

Roman, 570 P.2d at 1243 (quoting Note, Striking the Balance Between
Privacy and Supervision: The Fourth Amendment and Parole and
Probation Officer Searches of Parolees and Probationers, 51 N.Y.U. L.
Rev 800, 816 (1976)).
State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745,750,250 P.3d 796, 801 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Joubert v.
State, 926 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)).
The U.S. Supreme Court has also held, "[i]n executing a search warrant officers
may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety and the
efficacy of the search." Los Angeles Cty., California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.
Ct. 1989, 1992, 167 L. Ed. 2d 974 (2007) (citing Meuhler, 544 U.S. at 98-100 and

Summers, 542 U.S. at 704-705). Ensuring police safety and the efficacy of the search are
equally applicable considerations in a parole search context as they are in the context of a
valid search warrant. As such, the three factors raised in Summers pertaining to officer
safety and search efficacy should be evaluated in determining whether law enforcement's
action was reasonable.
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Justifications for the detention of individuals present when law enforcement arrives
to search a parolee's residence may include, (1) "preventing flight in the event that
incriminating evidence is found"; (2) "minimizing the risk of harm to the officers"; and (3)
"facilitating the orderly completion of the search ... [while] avoid[ing] the use of force."

Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03; see also Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98.
1.

"preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found"

The interest of "preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found"
does not apply when law enforcement arrives to conduct a parole search in the same way
that it does when law enforcement executes a search warrant. In the case of a search
warrant, there is probable cause to believe incriminating evidence will be found, and thus a
corresponding increased risk that suspects present may attempt flight. Flight and pursuit of
criminal suspects entail real and obvious safety risks to officers. In the case of a routine
parole search, there need be no pre-ordered suspicion beyond the parole officer's history
with the parolee.

If there is reasonable suspicion that an individual present at the parolee's residence
is actually involved in criminal activity or presents a safety risk, then the individual may be
detained for further investigation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In this case, the parties stipulated that Defendant was detained upon
law enforcement's entry into the parolee's apartment.

See Tr., p. 7.

When law

enforcement arrived to perform the residence check, law enforcement had no suspicion that
the parolee was violating any terms or conditions of his parole. Id. at 15-16. Upon arrival,
law enforcement entered the resident with the parolee's consent and observed Defendant
coming out of a bedroom with a backpack.

Id. at 29.
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Law enforcement then had

Defendant sit in the living room with the parolee while the search was conducted. Id. at
31-32. Law enforcement testified that Defendant was not "cleared to leave" at that time
"because of procedure." Id. at 37. While seated in the living room, Probation Officer
Kuebler asked the individuals present if there was anything else in the apartment and
notified them that a drug dog would be on scene if need be, at which point Defendant
stated that she had a meth pipe in her backpack. Id. at 12. When officers initially observed
Defendant, they did not see anything to indicate Defendant was armed. Id. at 34. Prior to
the officer's statement regarding a drug dog, law enforcement admittedly had no reason to
believe Defendant was violating any law or was about to commit a crime. Id. at 38.

As

such, law enforcement admitted that they did not have any reasonable suspicion that
Defendant was involved in criminal activity or posed a safety risk when Defendant was
detained upon law enforcement's entry.

Therefore, the detention cannot be justified

pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
The detention of an individual on the basis that she might flee if incriminating
evidence is found, without any suspicion that incriminating evidence will be found or any
reason to believe the individual would in fact flee, is unreasonable. The individual's
interest in avoiding seizure should prevail over the state's interest in preventing flight
where there is no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing by that
individual.
2. "minimizing the risk of harm to the officers"

In Summers, the Court recognized that, "[a]lthough no special danger to the police

is suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for
narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts
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to conceal or destroy evidence." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702, 101 S. Ct.
2587, 2594, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981). However, at the point of law enforcement's arrival
in the case of a routine parole residence check, there is no analogous threat of sudden
violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence because there need be no
underlying probable cause that evidence of criminal activity will actually be discovered.
This Court recognizes officer safety dictates that officers should at least be allowed
to identify new persons arriving and remaining on the premises during a search. However,
officer safety concerns are not served by preventing a visiting person from leaving the
premises, especially where, as here, at the time of the detention, officers were familiar with
Defendant from prior visits (Tr., pp. 19, 33), there was no suspicion of any criminal
activity by the parolee or by Defendant (Tr., pp. 15-16, 38), and the officers did not
perceive Defendant to pose a safety risk (Tr., p. 34).
3.

"facilitating the orderly completion of the search ... [while] avoid[ing] the
use of force."

In Summers and Meuhler, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that facilitating the
orderly completion of the search while avoiding the use of force may be served by the
detention of persons present at a residence during the execution of a search warrant
because "self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid
the use of force." Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-703; Meuhler, 544 U.S. at 1469-1470.
However, in Summers and Sanchez, the individuals detained were residents of the premises
to be searched. Summers, 452 U.S. at 694; Sanchez, 574 F.3d at 1171.
Defendant argues that "a non-resident is unlikely to be able to help with officer
completion of the search, as it is improbable that she has keys or special access to locked
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doors or containers." The State argues that the officers' interest in conducting an orderly
search "would be severely hampered if occupants of the residence were free to come and
go." The State does not explain how allowing someone to leave who was initially present,
where there is no suspicion of criminal activity and no perceived threat posed by the
person, would hamper an otherwise orderly search.
There is no evidence that this Defendant was able to open safes or other locked
containers or was able to otherwise aid in completing the search and avoiding the use of
force. The State has provided no further justification for why a visitor of the residence
must remain detained on-site to facilitate the orderly completion of the search. Thus,
facilitating the orderly completion of the search while avoiding the use of force does not
justify the detention of visitors present when law enforcement arrives to perform a parole
residence check.
Therefore, concerns of search efficacy and officer safety do not justify as
reasonable the automatic detention of visitors present when law enforcement arrives to
perform a residence check of a parolee.
Defendant was unlawfully seized when law enforcement arrived to perform the
residence check. The physical evidence and Defendant's statements to law enforcement
were the direct result of such illegal seizure. Therefore, the exclusionary rule mandates
that the evidence obtained as a direct result of the illegal seizure shall be suppressed.
II
II
II
II
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and upon facts specific to this case, the decision of
the magistrate court denying Defendant's motion to suppress is REVERSED.

SO ORDERED this

L

tL
day of June, 2018.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
KARI JANAE PIDPPS,
Defendant/Appellant.

_____ _____ _
I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-16-22188

Memorandum Decision and
Order on Appeal

INTRODUCTION

Defendant conditionally pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia following
the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant appeals the denial of her motion
to suppress, contending that the warrantless seizure of her person was unlawful and
without legal justification and that the physical evidence obtained and the statements made
to law enforcement were the result of the unlawful seizure.

II.

FACTS

Probation officers performed a residence check on a felony parolee. Tr., pp. 9-10.
The parolee consented to a search of his residence pursuant to the standard conditions of
parole.

See id. at 10-11, 29.

Probation officers had no suspicion of any criminal

wrongdoing or parole violations when they arrived to perform the residence check. Id. at
15-16.

Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal - 1

Page 88

When the officers arrived, Defendant was present in the residence along with the
parolee. Id. at 10-11. The parties stipulated to the fact that Defendant was detained at the
time probation officers entered into the residence to conduct the search.

Id. at 5-7.

Defendant was not on felony probation at the time of the search and there were no warrants
for her arrest. Id. at 37, 50. Although there was no testimony about whether Defendant
was a resident of the apartment, the State's briefing acknowledges that Defendant was a
visitor to the residence. See Respondent's Brief, p. 3; Appellant's Brief, p. 1; see also
Objection to Motion to Suppress, p. 1. However, the probation officers on scene were
familiar with Defendant from her presence during prior visits. Id. at 19, 33.
After drugs were found elsewhere in the residence, local law enforcement was
called. Id. at 11-12. Probation Officer Kuebler asked the individuals present if there was
anything else in the apartment and notified them that a drug dog would be on scene if need
be, at which point Defendant stated that she had a meth pipe in her backpack. Id. at 12.
Defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence found in her backpack and her
statements to law enforcement, contending that she was unlawfully seized during the
residence check. Defendant argues that the physical evidence and her statements to law
enforcement were obtained as the result of her illegal seizure. Defendanfs motion to
suppress was denied, and she now appeals.

III.

STANDARDS

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on
a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of
fact that are supported by substantial evidence but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916
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P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App.
1999).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures of persons or property. Searches or detentions conducted without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 45455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 575-76 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho
125, 129, 44 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Ct.App.2002). The State may overcome this presumption by
demonstrating that the search or seizure fell within a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. State v.

Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,431,925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct.App.1996).
A seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment occurs when an officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, restrains a citizen's liberty. State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct.App.1999). A seizure may take the form of either
an arrest or an investigative detention. An investigative detention is a seizure of limited
duration to investigate suspected criminal activity and does not offend the Fourth
Amendment if the facts available to the officer at the time gave rise to reasonable suspicion
to believe that criminal activity was afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479, 988 P.2d at 705; State v. Dice, 126 Idaho
595, 599, 887 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 347, 815
P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct.App.1991).
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Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the
exclusionary rule, which requires unlawfully seized evidence to be excluded. E.g., Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004). The exclusionary rule requires the

suppression of both "primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or
seizure, ... but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or
'fruit of the poisonous tree.'" Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S.Ct. 3380,
82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct.
266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939)); accord, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811-12, 203 P.3d at 121011.

IV.

ANALYSIS

This appeal raises the issue of whether law enforcement may detain individuals
found on the premises where a lawful parole (or probation) search is conducted pursuant to
the parolee's condition of parole requiring the parolee to consent to searches by law
enforcement.

Idaho appellate courts have not yet addressed this issue.

In State v.

Reynolds, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized this unresolved issue, but the Court of

Appeals decided Reynolds on other grounds. See State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 916,
155 P.3d 712 (Ct. App. 2007).
In the context of a search pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral and detached
judicial officer, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have held that
police are allowed to detain individuals present during the search, even without other
reasonable suspicion that those individuals are involved in criminal activity. Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2595, 69 L.Ed.2d 340, 351 (1981); State v.
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Kester, 137 Idaho 643, 646, 51 P.3d 457,460 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho
296, 47 P.3d 1266 (Ct.App.2002).
In Summers, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[t]he connection of an occupant to
that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining
that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant." Summers, 452
U.S. at 703-04. The Court further reasoned that in a search of a private home, ''the
additional intrusion caused by detention is slight" while "the justifications for detention are
substantial." Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-05. Those justifications include (1) ''preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found"; (2) "minimizing the risk of harm
to the officers"; and (3) "facilitating the orderly completion of the search ... [while]
avoid[ing] the use of force." Id. at 702-03; see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125
S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (confirming Summers's holding and also authorizing
reasonable force to detain occupants based on the circumstances).
th
In Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169 (9 Cir. 2009) (overruled on other grounds

by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012)), the Ninth Circuit held that
detention of the occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance search was
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, relying heavily on Summers and Meuhler.

Sanchez, like Meuhler, was a civil § 1983 case, but it evaluated the same Fourth
Amendment principles applicable here - whether it was reasonable to seize the occupants
of a residence while an authorized probation/parole residence check is performed.
In the case of a valid search warrant, a judge has necessarily determined that there
is probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity may be found in that
location. As reasoned in Summers, the probable cause determination provides a nexus
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between an individual's presence at the location and the suspected criminal activity,
rendering detention of individuals present reasonable during the execution of the warrant:
The existence of a search warrant, however, also provides an objective
justification for the detention. A judicial officer has determined that police
have probable cause to believe that someone in the home is committing a
crime. Thus a neutral magistrate rather than an officer in the field has
made the critical determination that the police should be given a special
authorization to thrust themselves into the privacy of a home. The
connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily
identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal
activity justifies a detention of that occupant.
Summers, 452 U.S. at 703-04.

However, that same nexus between an individual's presence and suspected criminal
activity does not exist when law enforcement arrives at a parolee's residence to perform a
routine search pursuant to standard conditions of parole rather than pursuant to probable
cause. Although the Sanchez court reasoned that that "parolees ... are more likely [than
ordinary citizens] to commit future criminal offenses,'' (see Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d
at 1175 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 853, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d
250 (2006))), this rationale should not extend to justify seizures of individuals who are not
parolees nor residents of the home but are merely present at a parolee's residence when
law enforcement arrives.
It would be unreasonable to subject an individual to searches and seizures by law
enforcement merely based on their association with a parolee and would run counter to the
policy goals of parolees' reintegration into society. In discussing whether a probation
officer must actually request permission to search or may enter unannounced, the Idaho
Court of Appeals recognized that the rights of persons associated with a probationer or
parolee and the policy objectives of parole and probation should be considered,
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One might reasonably argue that the purposes of probation would be better
advanced if [the condition] were interpreted as the State suggests-to
allow probation officers to conduct unrestricted, unannounced searches of
a probationer's residence. However, other societal interests support [the
probationer's] interpretation of [the condition]. As the supreme court
recognized in Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977), there is a
price to be paid for adopting a rule that probationers and parolees give up
all of their Fourth Amendment rights simply because they are on probation
or parole:
Fourth amendment protection will be diminished not only for
parolees, but also for the family and friends with whom the parolee
might be living. Those bystanders may find themselves subject to
warrantless searches only because they are good enough to shelter
the parolee, and they may therefore be less willing to help him-a
sadly ironic result in a system designed to encourage reintegration
into society.
Roman, 570 P.2d at 1243 (quoting Note, Striking the Balance Between
Privacy and Supervision: The Fourth Amendment and Parole and
Probation Officer Searches of Parolees and Probationers, 51 N.Y.U. L.
Rev 800,816 (1976)).
State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 750, 250 P.3d 796, 801 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Joubert v.
State, 926 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)).
The U.S. Supreme Court has also held, "[i]n executing a search warrant officers
may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety and the
efficacy of the search." Los Angeles Cty., California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.
Ct. 1989, 1992, 167 L. Ed. 2d 974 (2007) (citing Meuhler, 544 U.S. at 98-100 and
Summers, 542 U.S. at 704-705). Ensuring police safety and the efficacy of the search are
equally applicable considerations in a parole search context as they are in the context of a
valid search warrant. As such, the three factors raised in Summers pertaining to officer
safety and search efficacy should be evaluated in determining whether law enforcement's
action was reasonable.
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Justifications for the detention of individuals present when law enforcement arrives
to search a parolee's residence may include, (1) "preventing flight in the event that
incriminating evidence is found"; (2) "minimizing the risk of harm to the officers"; and (3)
"facilitating the orderly completion of the search ... [while] avoid[ing] the use of force."
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03; see also Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98.
1.

"preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found"

The interest of "preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found"
does not apply when law enforcement arrives to conduct a parole search in the same way
that it does when law enforcement executes a search warrant. In the case of a search
warrant, there is probable cause to believe incriminating evidence will be found, and thus a
corresponding increased risk that suspects present may attempt flight. Flight and pursuit of
criminal suspects entail real and obvious safety risks to officers. In the case of a routine
parole search, there need be no pre-ordered suspicion beyond the parole officer's history
with the parolee.

If there is reasonable suspicion that an individual present at the parolee's residence
is actually involved in criminal activity or presents a safety risk, then the individual may be
detained for further investigation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In this case, the parties stipulated that Defendant was detained upon
law enforcement's entry into the parolee's apartment.

See Tr., p. 7.

When law

enforcement arrived to perform the residence check, law enforcement had no suspicion that
the parolee was violating any terms or conditions of his parole. Id. at 15-16. Upon arrival,
law enforcement entered the resident with the parolee's consent and observed Defendant
coming out of a bedroom with a backpack.
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Id. at 29.

Law enforcement then had

Defendant sit in the living room with the parolee while the search was conducted. Id. at
31-32. Law enforcement testified that Defendant was not "cleared to leave" at that time
"because of procedure." Id. at 37. While seated in the living room, Probation Officer
Kuebler asked the individuals present if there was anything else in the apartment and
notified them that a drug dog would be on scene if need be, at which point Defendant
stated that she had a meth pipe in her backpack. Id. at 12. When officers initially observed
Defendant, they did not see anything to indicate Defendant was armed. Id. at 34. Prior to
the officer's statement regarding a drug dog, law enforcement admittedly had no reason to
believe Defendant was violating any law or was about to commit a crime. Id. at 38.

As

such, law enforcement admitted that they did not have any reasonable suspicion that
Defendant was involved in criminal activity or posed a safety risk when Defendant was
detained upon law enforcement's entry.

Therefore, the detention cannot be justified

pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
The detention of an individual on the basis that she might flee if incriminating
evidence is found, without any suspicion that incriminating evidence will be found or any
reason to believe the individual would in fact flee, is unreasonable.

The individual's

interest in avoiding seizure should prevail over the state's interest in preventing flight
where there is no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing by that
individual.
2. "minimizing the risk of harm to the officers"

In Summers, the Court recognized that, "[a]lthough no special danger to the police
is suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for
narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts
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to conceal or destroy evidence." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702, 101 S. Ct.
2587, 2594, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981 ). However, at the point of law enforcement's arrival
in the case of a routine parole residence check, there is no analogous threat of sudden
violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence because there need be no
underlying probable cause that evidence of criminal activity will actually be discovered.
This Court recognizes officer safety dictates that officers should at least be allowed
to identify new persons arriving and remaining on the premises during a search. However,
officer safety concerns are not served by preventing a visiting person from leaving the
premises, especially where, as here, at the time of the detention, officers were familiar with
Defendant from prior visits (Tr., pp. 19, 33), there was no suspicion of any criminal
activity by the parolee or by Defendant (Tr., pp. 15-16, 38), and the officers did not
perceive Defendant to pose a safety risk (Tr., p. 34).
3.

"facilitating the orderly completion of the search ... [while] avoid[ing] the
use of force."

In Summers and Meuhler, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that facilitating the
orderly completion of the search while avoiding the use of force may be served by the
detention of persons present at a residence during the execution of a search warrant
because "self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid
the use of force." Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-703; Meuhler, 544 U.S. at 1469-1470.
However, in Summers and Sanchez, the individuals detained were residents of the premises
to be searched. Summers, 452 U.S. at 694; Sanchez, 574 F.3d at 1171.
Defendant argues that "a non-resident is unlikely to be able to help with officer
completion of the search, as it is improbable that she has keys or special access to locked
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doors or containers." The State argues that the officers' interest in conducting an orderly
search "would be severely hampered if occupants of the residence were free to come and
go." The State does not explain how allowing someone to leave who was initially present,
where there is no suspicion of criminal activity and no perceived threat posed by the
person, would hamper an otherwise orderly search.
There is no evidence that this Defendant was able to open safes or other locked
containers or was able to otherwise aid in completing the search and avoiding the use of
force. The State has provided no further justification for why a visitor of the residence
must remain detained on-site to facilitate the orderly completion of the search. Thus,
facilitating the orderly completion of the search while avoiding the use of force dpes not
justify the detention of visitors present when law enforcement arrives to perform a parole
residence check.
Therefore, concerns of search efficacy and officer safety do not justify as
reasonable the automatic detention of visitors present when law enforcement arrives to
perform a residence check of a parolee.
Defendant was unlawfully seized when law enforcement arrived to perform the
residence check. The physical evidence and Defendant's statements to law enforcement
were the direct result of such illegal seizure. Therefore, the exclusionary rule mandates
that the evidence obtained as a direct result of the illegal seizure shall be suppressed.

II
II
II
II

Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal - 11

Page 98

V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and upon facts specific to this case, the decision of
the magistrate court denying Defendant's motion to suppress is REVERSED.

tL

SO ORDERED this

-1:_ day of June, 2018.
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